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The Evolution of General Administrative Law and the Emergence of Postmodern 
Administrative Law 
Karl-Heinz Ladeur* 
I. PRELIMINARY REMARKS 
The discussion on “international administrative law” has been established – following the logic 
of its object – as an international topic for quite some time. However, this evolution does not 
exclude the differentiation of, so to speak, regional and methodologically approaches within 
the global network of legal research: in the US, one can observe a focus on “global 
administrative law” at the law faculty of NYU – and this shift of the accent to “global” instead of 
“international administrative law” is not without consequences. The focus is more on case 
studies and methodological questions.1 This approach corresponds with the ideas of an Italian 
group of researchers, which has been set up at Viterbo,2 and with other individual contributors 
to the international discussion. In as far as one can already talk about an established field of 
research in Germany, one can observe a different focus on a rather traditional systematic 
differentiation of certain “matters” which are undergoing a process of internationalisation.3 In 
the following, an approach will be developed which tries to build a bridge between global and 
domestic administrative law. It will be shown that there is a close link between the evolution of 
administrative law in postmodernity and the emergence of global administrative law, and that 
the basic institutions of administrative law are products of the autonomous rationality of 
administration. This sheds new light on the questions of both the accountability and the 
legitimation of transnational global networks. 
* The author is professor emeritus of public law at the University of Hamburg, as of 2008 he is Distinguished 
Bremen Professor at the Bremen International Graduate School of Social Sciences, Bremen (Germany); from 1994 
to 2002 he was professor at the law department of the European University Institute, Florence (Italy). Email: Karl-
Heinz Ladeur <karl-heinz.ladeur@jura.uni-hamburg.de> 
1  See Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, (68 LAW 
AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS, 15 (2005); Carol Harlow, Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles 
and Values”, 17 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 187 (2006); Jean-Bernard Auby, LA 
GLOBALISATION. LE DROIT ET L’ETAT, 2nd ed., 2010. 
2 www.ricercaitaliana.it/prin/unita 
3 See the contributions in: INTERNATIONALES VERWALTUNGSRECHT (Christoph Möllers & Andreas Voßkuhle, eds) 
2007). 
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II. THE AUTOPOIESIS OF LAW AND THE EMERGENCE OF GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 
A. NO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW BEYOND DELEGATION OF POWER? THE SELF-GENERATIVE FUNCTION
OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS 
In systems theory, the focus of the observation of the legal system shifts from norms to 
decision-making, i.e., the legal system is regarded as being composed of decisions, not of 
persons and not of norms as the object of application to specific cases. At least, this is 
constitutive of the difference between centre (decisions) and periphery (legislation) of the legal 
system. This may sound counter-intuitive to traditional approaches to law, and it may not do 
sufficient justice to the practice of contracting4 and other transactions, which do not take on 
the form of a binding decision.5 However, this discussion will not be taken up here. The 
autopoietic construction of the legal system as processing from decision to decision is opposed 
to a more traditional conception of decision-making as deriving (specific) decisions for cases 
from a (general) norm which is integrated in a whole system of legal rules and – super-imposed 
at this level of norms – a set of principles which integrate the law in a system. For the purposes 
of this article, the difference between continental European and Anglo-American law will be left 
aside, because, as will be shown later, the blind spot of the most diffused approaches to the 
understanding of the self-transformation of the legal system that the law undergoes under the 
pressure of the evolution of modern society is the same in both traditions. The focus of the 
following assumption is more on the inevitable autonomy of not only judicial, but also 
administrative, decision-making, which allows for a recognition of the creative normative 
function of the processing of administrative decision-making.6
4 See Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Contracting State, 45 UNIVERSITY OF LOS ANGELES LAW 
REVIEW, 1 (1998); ead., The Contracting State, 28 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, 155 (2001), (arguing 
that the rise of the contract in administrative action is a sign of a general transformation towards a more open 
type of “governance” and not a symptom of decline of democratic legitimation of administrative agencies); Alfred 
A. Aman jr., Globalization, and the Need for a New Administrative Law, 49 UNIVERSITY OF LOS ANGELES LAW 
REVIEW,p. 1687 (2002); for a critique, see Mark Seidenfeld, An Apology for Administrative Law in the “Contracting 
State”, 28 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, 215 (2001), (emphasising the flexibility that was already 
inherent in traditional administrative law); for the far advanced practices of the contracting state in the UK, see 
Peter Vincent-Jones, THE NEW CONTRACTING STATE: REGULATION, RESPONSIVENESS, RELATIONALITY (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006). 
 The traditional conception tends 
to reduce the creative norm-generating role beyond the legislative authority to the judiciary 
whereas the this normative role of the administration is left in the shadow. Modern 
5 See in a theoretical perspective Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Das subjektive Recht als Medium der Selbstransformation des 
Rechts and Gerechtigkeit als deren Parasit, p. 109 & 114 et seq., in: ZUR (UN-) MÖGLICHKEIT EINER 
GESELLSCHAFTSTHEORIE DER GERECHTIGKEIT (Gunther Teubner, ed., 2008). 
6 Jerry L. Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists: Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the Republican Era 
1801-1829,116 YALE LAW REVIEW 1636 (2007). 
2011]                                 THE EVOLUTION OF GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW                                5 
administrative law cannot, of course, deny a creative element that is termed “discretion”, 
although this leeway for administrative autonomy is hidden within the idea of a legislative 
delegation of power.7
 
 
“Delegation” includes the assumption that the domain of options within which the “delegated” 
power of administrative decision-makers can develop is defined by the legislator. However, 
global administrative law is confronted with the design of forms, instruments and procedures 
beyond the established rules of general administrative law and its inherent structuring 
function.8 As will be shown in more detail below, the fundamental forms and components of 
general administrative law have not been developed by the legislator nor by the judiciary 
(which has made some of its implicit rules explicit), but by an experimental search process of 
the administration itself.9
 
 The ensuing “reverse” process of norm-generation – from 
administrative experimental rule generation to explicit stabilisation through courts and finally 
through legislation – appears to be incompatible with the traditional understanding of the 
separation of powers. 
This unavoidable self-generative element of the legal system is due to the fact that we have to 
distinguish- from explicit rule-making - an evolutionary process of self-transformation of (not 
only administrative) law, which is due to the dynamic of society at large, including its 
knowledge basis and the social norms and expectations that try to cope with the societal 
complexity. As will be discussed later, the basic forms of both administrative and private law 
are not created by the legislator, but are, instead, stabilised ex post by the formulation of 
historical “versions” in the legislative process which correspond to a societal challenge which is 
managed - in a first step - by administrative or judicial decision-makers (the latter in private 
law). 
 
                                                 
7 See only the overview in Francesca Bignami, The Administrative State in a Separation of Powers Constitution: 
Lessons for European Community Rule-Making from the United States, Jean Monnet Center for International and 
Regional Economic Law and Justice, New York University, 1999; for a critique see Jerry L. Mashaw, Federal 
Administration and Administrative Law of the Gilded Age, 119 YALE LAW JOURNAL 1362, 1377 et seq. (2010). 
8 See Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann, DAS ALLGEMEINE VERWALTUNGSRECHT ALS ORDNUNGSIDEE (2d ed., 2004). 
9 The role of courts in the development of general administrative law is overstated when the latter is reduced to 
judge-made law, see Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of ‘Law’ in Global Administrative Law, 20 EUROPEAN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW23 (2009): from the absence of a legislative delegation of power to 
administrative deciders does not follow a supplementary norm generating role of courts alone, administration 
itself has to be regarded as the creator of the instruments and forms of administrative law; the role of the judges 
consisted rather in the doctrinal stabilisation of the institutions of general administrative law, for the role of 
doctrine in general administrative law see Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann, ALLGEMEINES VERWALTUNGSRECHT ALS 
ORDNUNGSIDEE ( 2nd ed., 2006) 3 et seq. and Jens Kersten & Sophie-Charlotte Lenski, Die Entwicklungsfunktion des 
Allgemeinen Verwaltungsrechts, 42 DIE VERWALTUNG 503 (2009); Oliver Lepsius, Themen der 
Rechtswissenschaftstheorie, 1, 27, in:, RECHTSWISSENSCHAFTSTHEORIE (Matthias Jestaedt & id. , eds., 2008) . For 
a critique of simplistic “functionalist” conception of legislation as the (generative) democratic will see Martin 
Loughlin, PUBLIC LAW AND POLITICAL THEORY 60 (2003); id., WHAT IS PUBLIC LAW?, 151 et seq. (2003).  
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Neither administrative nor private law can be understood and practiced without the 
observation of social norms and cognitive assumptions of normality. The legal system is linked 
permanently to the “collective knowledge” of society10 and the basic forms of attribution of 
responsibility: in modernity, we can first observe the emergence of the “society of 
individuals”,11 which provokes the rise of a new administrative law based upon individual 
decisions. The next stage of the evolution of administrative law is characterised by the new 
paradigms derived from the requirements of the “society of organisations” and its 
consequences (such as planning law, the forms of the welfare state, etc.) The forms and 
procedures of this new stage of administrative law had to be found in an experimental process 
first, and could afterwards be integrated in new types of laws and legal procedures of decision-
making. We are now confronted with a new change of paradigm, the rise of the “network 
society”, which, again, demands new administrative forms and procedures for decision-making 
in conditions of increasing complexity. With Jerry L. Mashaw, one might describe the evolution 
of administrative law as underlying a “cyclical oscillation between categorical and contextual 
norms”.12
 
 Administrative law is deeply characterised by paradigmatic transformations which 
are initiated by administrative decision-makers in experimental processes and finally stabilised 
by court practice and the legislator. 
The hypothesis which underlies the following reflections is based upon the assumption that the 
globalisation process does not invade a stable domestic administrative (or private) legal system 
from outside, but that it is also a consequence of an evolutionary process that disrupts the legal 
system from within. It goes without saying that this evolutionary model does not assume that 
the new paradigms replace the older ones completely13
 
, but that we have to conceive of the 
legal system of postmodernity as being multi-layered because the new paradigms are based 
upon a secondary respectively tertiary re-modelling of the preceding one. This hypothesis can 
explain the unavoidable and legitimate creative role of administrative agencies in the new 
transnational realm of decision-making, and allows for a more systematic self-reflection of the 
dynamic process of change in administrative and private law. 
  
                                                 
10 One can even speak about the “fact” in legal contexts as not being a “truth” but the product of a legal 
procedure, Barbara J. Shapiro, A CULTURE OF FACT. ENGLAND, 1550 – 1720, 11 (2000). 
11 Norbert Elias,THE SOCIETY OF INDIVIDUALS(1939 in German, 1991). 
12 Jerry L. Mashaw, Accountability and Intellectual Design: Some Thoughts on the Grammar of Governance, 115, 
154 et seq., in: PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS, EXPERIENCES (Michael Dowdle, ed., 2006).  
13 This is why the question posed by Carolyn J. Hill & Laurence E. Lynn, Is Hierarchical Governance in Decline? 
Evidence from Empirical Research, 15 JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. RESEARCH AND THEORY ( 2005) 173, 
189, is legitimate though the authors’ quantitative focus on the permanence of hierarchical structures of decision 
making is only of limited analytical value.  
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B. A SIDE LOOK AT PRIVATE LAW: IS LEX MERCATORIA LAW? 
 
Some legal theorists have put forward the claim that global law, the Lex Mercatoria as a self-
organised practice of private law, in particular, has to be regarded as “less closed” and less 
autonomous.14 However, this would be a misunderstanding: as will be shown later, global law 
differs considerably from state-based law; this notwithstanding, the law should not be regarded 
as losing its autonomy under conditions of globalisation. Instead, the network paradigm can 
contribute to a better understanding of the new types of transnational legal practices: Lex 
Mercatoria lacks the coherence and methodological foundation of traditional private law,15 but 
this is not a problem, because the common frame of interests of (mainly) big transnational 
firms can compensate for the lack of guidance of the arbitration practices. Its openness is 
further attenuated by the practice of referring to clusters of arbitration decisions and the 
UNIDROIT-principles.16
 
 A parallel might be drawn between this new type of entanglement of 
norms and contracts in private law, and the new creative function of administrative agencies, 
which consists of the design of new forms of action in transnational networks of public and 
private actors. 
The disruptions and fragmentations emerging from the evolution of the “global law beyond a 
state”17
                                                 
14 Assuming only a “relative autonomy” and reducing the law finally to what the judge say what the law is: Michel 
van de Kerchove und François Ost, LE DROIT OU LES PARADOXES DU JEU (1992); for an alternative position see G. 
Teubner, Breaking Frames: The Global Interplay of Legal and Social Systems, 45 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW 149 (1997), id. & Peter Korth, Zwei Arten des Rechtspluralismus: Normkollisionen in der 
doppelten Fragmentierung der Weltgesellschaft, 137 in: NORMATIVE PLURALITÄT ORDNEN (Mattias Kötter & 
Gunnar Folke Schuppert, eds., 2009); from a political science perspective Alec Stone Sweet, The New Lex 
Mercatoria and Transnational Governance, 13 JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 627 (2006). 
 or, rather, from a heterarchical “network of networks” of law with varying 
combinations of characteristics according to actors, transactions, knowledge bases do not – 
according to systems theory – call into question the autonomy of law as a self-constructing 
system which operates with its own tool box and observes itself within its own horizon, which 
15 Wolfgang Peter, Jean-Quentin de Kuyper & Benedict de Candolle, ARBITRATION AND RENEGOTIATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 152 (1995); Paul Lagarde, Approche critique de la Lex Mercatoria, in: 
ETUDES OFFERTES À BERTHOLD GOLDMANN 125, 133 (1983); Andreas Abegg, From the Social Contract to a Social 
Contract Law. Forms an Functions of Administrative Contracts in a Fragmented Society: A Continental View, Center 
for the Study of Law and Society Faculty Working Paper, February 2008. 
16 Axel Metzger, EXTRA LEGEM, INTRA IUS. ALLGEMEINE RECHTSGRUNDSÄTZE IM EUROPÄISCHEN PRIVATRECHT 
533 (2009); Ursula Stein, LEX MERCATORIA 242 (1995); for the evolution of its self-reflexive momentum see also 
Gunther Teubner,”Global Bukowina”. Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in: GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE, 12 
(1997); Andreas Fischer-Lescano & id., Regime Collision The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of 
Global Law, 25 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 999 (2004); Peer Zumbansen, Piercing the Legal Veil: 
Commercial Arbitration and Transnational Law, 8 EUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL 400 (2002); Gralf-Peter Calliess & M. 
Renner, From Soft Law to Hard Code: The juridification of Global Governance, SSRN-WP 2007; Andreas Fischer-
Lescano, Transnationales Verwaltungsrecht, 63 JURISTENZEITUNG 373 (2008); see also the contributions in: 
INTERNATIONALES VERWALTUNGSRECHT (Christoph Möllers, Andreas Voßkuhle & Christian Walter, eds., 2007). 
17 See Gunther Teubner, Breaking Frames: Economic Globalization and the Emergence of Lex Mercatoria, 5 
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIAL THEORY 199 (2002). 
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cannot but draw a distinction between itself and its environment (the other systems in 
particular) and is not just driven by external forces (like the political or the economic system).18
 
 
However, it is not without consequence that it is not just from the point of view of systems 
theory that the question “is global law ‘law’?” has to be raised.19 The doubt that the question 
may be answered in the negative is one of the uncertainties which irritate the professional 
observers of the practices that are termed “global law” as opposed to international law.20 This 
is probably one of the reasons why N. Luhmann took the view that the “world society”21 - 
beyond the legally-structured nation state and the international public law as centred on the 
nation state as well - is increasingly governed by “cognitive” rules,22
 
 and not in any traditional 
normative mode. 
C. GLOBAL LAW – IS IT LAW? 
 
In the present discussion on global law, the question “Is it law?” has been raised in particular by 
G. Teubner,23 and, recently, by B. Kingsbury.24
                                                 
18 Kingsbury, supra, note 9; David Dyzenhaus, The Concept of (Global) Administrative Law’, IILJ Working Paper 
2008/7, 
 The recognition of a possible “generation of 
www.iilj.org; for lex mercatoria Teubner , supra, note 17 ; id & Korth, supra, note 14. 
19 Kingsbury, supra, note 9; see also Alec Stone Sweet & Florian Grisel, L’arbitrage international: Du contrat 
dyadique au système normatif, 52 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DE DROIT 75 (2009) who focus on the judge-like 
stabilisation of a “dyadic” normative practice by a third party; this view underestimates the autonomous creative 
potential of a transsubjective practice.  
20 See Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann, Die Herausforderung der Verwaltungsrechtswissenschaft durch die 
Internationalisierung der Verwaltungsbeziehungen, 45 DER STAAT 315 (2006); Franz C. Mayer, DIE 
INTERNATIONALISIERUNG DES VERWALTUNGSRECHTS (2006); Auby, supra, note 1; Stefano Battini, 
AMMINISTRAZIONI SENZA STATO. PROFILI DI DIRITTO AMMINISTRATIVO INTERNAZIONALE (2003); Sabino Cassese, 
LO SPAZIO GIURIDICO GLOBALE (2003); id., The Globalisation of Law, 37 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 976 (2006); Richard B. Stewart, The Global Regulatory Challenge to U.S. 
Administrative Law, 695. 
21 For the concept of the “world society” see Niklas Luhmann, Die Weltgesellschaft, 51, in: SOZIOLOGISCHE 
AUFKLÄRUNG, Vol. 2, (id., 1975). 
22 David Kennedy, The Mystery of Global Governance, 37, 58, in: RULING THE WORLD? CONSTITUTIONALISM, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, eds., 2009).  
23 Gunther Teubner, Self-Constitutionalization of Transnational Corporations? On the Linkage of “Private” and 
“Public” Corporate Codes of Conduct, 17 INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 2010, to appear; id., 
Constitutionalising Polycontexturality, 19 SOCIAL AND LEGAL STUDIES 2010, to appear; id., The Corporate Codes of 
Multinationals: Company Constitutions Beyond Corporate Governance and Co-Determination, 203, in: CONFLICT OF 
LAWS AND LAWS OF CONFLICT IN EUROPE AND BEYOND (Rainer Nickel, ed., 2010); see also id., supra, note 10, 3; 
see also Jean-Marie Guéhenno, THE END OF THE NATION STATE (1995), 100. 
24 Kingsbury, supra, note 9; for a critique see Ming-Sung Kuo, Inter-Public Legality or Post-Public-Legitimacy?, A 
Response to Professor Kingsbury’s Conception of Global Administrative Law, 20 EJIL 997 (2009; see also Ralf 
Michaels & Nils Jansen, Private Law Beyond the State? Europeanization, Globalization, Privatization, 55 AMERICAN 
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norms as a spontaneous process” between equal private actors seems to be quite acceptable 
for traditional approaches to law.25 However, this is different with reference to public law, 
which seems to be based upon the will of an institutionalised legislator or a delegation of law-
making power.26 Some authors even go so far as to deny any evolutionary dimension of public 
law that is said to be “intentionally steered”.27 Traditional public law still draws on the forms 
that have emerged in the realm of the nation state, and tends to deny the legal character of the 
new phenomena of global law when it seems to transcend the borders of international law.28 
The uncertainties of the new legal order which no longer fit in the forms of law, which have 
been moulded by, and with reference to, the state are expressed by the use of the term “soft 
law”.29 Jerry L. Mashaw has convincingly argued that the doubts of the “lawness” of global 
administrative law stem from the same origin as the conventional ignorance of the generative 
power of administration that manifests itself in the emergence of the “internal administrative 
law” in the 19th century.30
 
 In the following, it will be shown that the basic transformations 
domestic administrative law has undergone in the last decades can only be explained if such an 
evolutionary dimension of public law, which opens a new perspective also on the emergence of 
global administrative law, is recognised. 
In international private law, the question of whether Lex Mercatoria is law is controversial, as 
well..31
                                                                                                                                                             
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW 843 (2007), who give an overview of the discussion and demonstrate the 
primarily semantic character of the controversy; Gralf-Peter Calliess & Peer Zumbansen, ROUGH CONSENSUS AND 
RUNNING CODE. A THEORY OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 79, 113 (2010), take the view that elements of domestic law 
that are transplanted to the transnational sphere of law undergo a “transmutation” – one may think that this is but 
another version of the semantic controversy.  
 In global administrative law, the question can – apparently - be left open according to 
25 See Christoph Möllers, Transnational Constitutionalism Without a Public Law?, 329, in: TRANSNATIONAL 
GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM (Christian Joerges, Inger-Johanne Sand & Gunther Teubner, eds., 2004). 
26 See with reference to (domestic) standards Veeck v. Southern Building Code Congress International, 293 F3d 
791, 799 (5th Cir. 2002); Harm Schepel, Constituting Private Governance Regimes, 161, 162: in: Joerges et al., (eds.), 
ibid. 
27 Möllers, supra, note 25, 330, 338. 
28 For the sources of international law that are relevant in global administrative law See Benedict Kingsbury, Nico 
Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY 
PROBLEMS 15, 29 (2005); for the necessity to go beyond these norms in the traditional sense see Christian Tietje, 
Recht ohne Rechtsquellen?, 24 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 27, 40 (2003). 
29 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Soft Law and International the Law of the Environment, 12 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 420 (1991); Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation 
Through Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VANDERBILT OF 
TRANSNATIONAL LAW 501 (2009); for the far spread conceptual vagueness see also Anne Peters & Lucy Koechlin, 
Towards Non State-Actors as Effective, Legitimate, and Accountable Standard Setters, 492, 495, in: NON-STATE 
ACTORS AS STANDARD SETTERS (ead, ead.,Till Förster, and Gretta Fenner Zinkernagel, eds., 2009).  
30 Mashaw, supra, note 6, 1470, 1476. 
31 See Ralf Michaels, The True Lex Mercatoria: Law Beyond the State, 14 NDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL 
STUDIES 447 (2007) (that lex mercatoria can neither be reduced to “anational” law nor to a derivative of state law 
but hat attained a new quality of a law beyond the state that combines diverse elements ); see the documentation 
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many authors, because also domestic administrative practice have acknowledged a number of 
forms of preparation, of internal rule-making, procedures which have a strong impact on the 
legal processes without being (unanimously) regarded as being legal acts or legal norms in the 
stricter sense.32 G. Teubner – as a private lawyer – is focused on private legal norms, and takes 
the view that it is “global civil society” to which the new forms of societal legal norms can, and, 
indeed, have to, be attributed as an authoritative “source” of law beyond the state. This 
approach pre-supposes a new “societal constitutionalism”33 that stipulates a law-making 
potential beyond the traditional forms of the state.34 The spontaneously generated norms of 
transnational operations (not only commercial in the narrower sense, but also including the 
“Lex Digitalis” of the global communication order or Lex Sportiva35 as the law of the 
transnational sports organisations and their rule-making requirements) are not generally 
recognised as law36 by state-based tribunals, whereas, in fact, as long as this “law” can make 
use of its own institutions (the international mediation procedures), it is, at least, a functional 
equivalent to law in the stricter sense. G. Teubner takes a more principled approach and, as a 
consequence of the acknowledgment of the norm-giving power of the “global civil society”, 
attributes legal character in the stricter sense to Lex Mercatoria – following the terminology of 
H.L.A. Hart - because it has generated its own “secondary rules”, i.e., procedures of reflection, 
distinction and control, as opposed to non-institutionalised norms of morality, etc.37
                                                                                                                                                             
of the controversy in Klaus-Peter Berger, FORMALISIERTE ODER “SCHLEICHENDE KODIFIIZIERUNG” DES 
INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFTSRECHTS (1996) (containing a differentiated discussion of all major pros and cons 
with reference to the question “is it law?”; see also (skeptically) Jan Kropkoller, INTERNATIONALES EINHEITSRECHT 
123 (1996); more positively: Ursula Stein, LEX MERCATORIA 211 et seq. (1996); Hans-Joachim Mertens, Das Lex 
Mercatoria Problem, in: FESTSCHRIFT ODERSKY 857, 860 (Reinhard Böttcher et al., 1996).  
 This 
reference risks to be reductionist because it sets aside the paradox of the self-generation of the 
law as a social practice, as a “language” with its eigenvalue, and to end up in a circular 
32 Joel Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEXAS 
LAW REVIEW 553 (1998) (describing the normative effects of technology on the legal structure of transactions via 
information technology). . 
33 David Sciulli, THEORY OF SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: FOUNDATIONS OF A NON-MARXIST CRITICAL THEORY 
(1992). 
34 Gunther Teubner, Verfassungen ohne Staat? Zur Konstitutionalisierung transnationaler Regimes, in: RECHT 
OHNE STAAT (to appear, Klaus Günther & Stefan Kadelbach, eds., 2010). 
35 Reidenberg, supra, note 32; Birgit Rost, DIE HERAUSBILDUNG TRANSNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFTSRECHTS AUF 
DEM GEBIET DER INTERNATIONALEN FINANZ- UND KAPITALMÄRKTE 251 (2007); Christopher M. Bruner, States, 
Markets, and Gatekeepers: Public-Private Regulatory Regimes in an Era of Economic Globalization, 30 MICHIGAN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 125, 165 (2008);.Franck Latty, LA LEX SPORTIVA. RECHERCHE SUR LE DROIT 
TRANSNATIONAL (2007). 
36 See for this argument with reference to the Lex Mercatoria Berger, supra, note 31, 75; for a theoretical 
reconstruction of an autonomous law beyond the state ee Gunther Teubner, Breaking Frames: Globalisation and 
the Emergence of Lex Mercatoria, 5 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIAL THEORY 199 (2002).  
37 See Teubner & Korth, supra, note 14. 
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argumentation which shifts the criterion for the recognition of “lawness” just to a meta-norm.38
 
 
Such an approach tends to neglect the emergent character of legal institutions which are only 
stabilized by secondary norms “after the fact”. The following analysis tries to shed some light 
on the historical transformations within domestic administrative law which generate new 
institutions in emergent processes for a better understanding of the specificity of a global 
administrative law perhaps not “without the state” but with “entangled hierarchies” which do 
not (yet?) allow for a clear distinction of “primary” and “secondary norms”.  
III. THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
 
A. THE ESSENCE OF THE “POSITIVE LAW” OF THE LIBERAL SOCIETY: ITS RULE-LIKE CHARACTER 
 
In a deeper sense, a law that – as one might rephrase the above-mentioned quotation from the 
recent book of Joyce Appleby – rests on the assumption that “nobody is in charge of the 
collective order”, is “positive”.39 As a consequence, it is “non-instrumental”, in the sense that it 
refers to a “relationship in terms of rules”.40 These rules are decoupled from substantive values, 
and allow for the co-ordination among agents who pursue their self-chosen goals. This 
assumption raises a lot of criticism about the collective and social character of the individual – a 
criticism which misses the point. Clearly, the individual is not - in a meaningful sense - to be pre-
supposed as the creator of his or her own self. Individuality is - itself - a social form that 
underlies permanent change.41 The non-instrumentality of the “positive” law and its 
corresponding conception of individual freedom do not invoke the “voluntary disposition of 
self-interested economic actors”.42 They pre-suppose an acentric society the collective order of 
which resides in the permanent emergence of innovations that establish a “play of ideas”,43
                                                 
38 Cf. Jean d’Aspremont, Hart et le positivisme postmoderne en droit international, 113 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL 635 (2009); also Niklas Luhmann, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM 123, 125 et seq. (2004). 
 a 
pool of variety that contains an excess of possibilities over reality generated from the practices 
of co-operation, competition, imitation, and experimentation in society. Clearly, this process 
generates not only spontaneously, but also in a reflexive form of second order observation of 
the very rules and patterns its own infrastructure, meta-rules and stabilising institutions. 
However, it is most important to underline that the individual as a merely “self-interested 
39 Joyce Appleby, THE RELENTLESS REVOLUTION: A HISTORY OF CAPITALISM 248 (2010). 
40 Michael Oakeshott, ON HUMAN CONDUCT 140 (1975); Terry Nardin, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MICHAEL OAKESHOTT 
202 (2001); see also, EdwardF. McClennen, Rationality and Rules,13, in: Peter A. Danielson (ed), MODELING 
RATIONALITY, MORALITY AND EVOLUTION 13 (1998). 
41 See, generally, Markus Schroer, DAS INDIVIDUUM DER GESELLSCHAFT (2003); Jean-Claude Kaufmann, 
L’INVENTION DE SOI: UNE THÉORIE DE L’IDENTITÉ (2004); Kenneth J. Gergen, THE SATURATED SELF: DILEMMAS OF 
IDENTITY IN CONTEMPORARY LIFE (1992); Joanne Finkelstein, THE ART OF SELF-INVENTION (2007). 
42 Wolfgang Streeck, RE-FORMING CAPITALISM. INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE GERMAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 
156 (2010). 
43 Appleby, supra, note 39, 156. 
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economic actor” is primarily not a myth of liberal society, but one of its critics. This can be 
demonstrated by referring to the present discussion of the protection of the “commons” of 
culture against private appropriation in the digital world and its equivalent in the genetic 
engineering. The relationship between privately-owned knowledge and the “intellectual 
commons” is a permanent problem of liberal society, but one should not overlook the 
collective, albeit distributed, character of the core of the “common knowledge” of society,44 
which was characterised by open access and restricted by patent law only to a limited extent. In 
the economic order of the liberal society, a “culture of improvement” 45 is enshrined, which 
was always open to knowledge transfer which was, to a large extent, not only accepted as being 
unavoidable, but also as being productive for the permanent generation of technological 
innovation and competition. This process does not exclude “public intervention” – on the 
contrary, apparently, the public knowledge infrastructure in countries such as Germany in the 
19th century had a positive impact on the culture of innovation.46
 
 
B. THE GENERATION OF THE “ACTE ADMINISTRATIF” AS THE MAIN FORM OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
ACTION IN THE “SOCIETY OF THE INDIVIDUALS” 
 
The focus on legitimation and the derivative logic of the “application” of norms to cases misses 
the internal dynamics of the legal system, which is due to the subjective right as an institution 
which not only opens the potential for societal self-organisation of the economy, politics, the 
arts, etc., but also opens society towards a distributed rationality of continuous transformation 
because it changes the temporal orientation from the past (the “given” and its reproduction as 
the aim of society) to the future and the uncertainty that it generates. The legal norms basically 
do not “steer” society in modernity, but protect the self-organisational potential inherent in the 
unrest which it introduces in the “society of the individuals”.47 This self-organisational potential 
comes to the fore when the legal system is challenged by the dynamic knowledge base which 
generates “experience” as a distributed type of knowledge which no longer accepts a central 
privileged point of observation of society which is either “given” by tradition or claimed to be 
possessed by the political sovereign power in the European absolutist states.48
                                                 
44 See for this concept Herbert Gintis, Rationality and Common Knowledge, 22 RATIONALITY AND SOCIETY 259 
(2010).  
 In Germany, this 
“sovereign” knowledge, which combines normative and empirical aspects in as much as it 
45 Robert Friedel, A CULTURE OF IMPROVEMENT: TECHNOLOGY AND THE WESTERN MILLENNIUM (2007). 
46 See generally Rainer Wolf, DER STAND DER TECHNIK (1986); Milos Več, RECHT UND NORMIERUNG IN DER 
INDUSTRIELLEN REVOLUTION 272, 367 (2006). 
47 See only Appleby, supra, note 39, 248. 
48 See on the emergence of the public knowledge that is needed for the government of the absolutist state Michel 
Senellart, LES ARTS DE GOUVERNER. DU REGIMEN MEDIEVAL AU CONCEPT DE GOUVERNEMENT, 236 et seq. 
(1995). 
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claims that the administrative state holds this privileged position which allows us to know what 
the requirements of the public order are, is termed “Polizeywissenschaft” (“police science”).49
 
 
The new administrative law of the second half of the 19th century50 undergoes a fundamental 
change when it accepts that the concept of order mainly refers to a factual normality and its 
description by societal experience, and is no longer based upon the traditional knowledge of 
the sovereign state.51 This is why it would be superficial to take the “acte administratif” 
(“Verwaltungsakt”), the sovereign unilateral administrative decision that has binding force even 
if it is not in conformity with the law, at face value.52 It is meant to to deliver “fixed points” in 
the “floating mass of administrative activities”.53 Both legislation and legal doctrine were more 
interested in very broad issues of the general legal order, whereas the operation with the 
increasing complexity of technical knowledge and industrial innovation were left to the 
discretion of administrators.54 The “acte administratif” corresponds to the distributed logic of 
the “private law society” (Privatrechtsgesellschaft)55 which processes innovation, experiment 
and social experience.56 The authoritarian character57
                                                 
49 Matthias Bohlender, Metamorphosen des Gemeinwohls – von der Herrschaft guter polizey zur Regierung durch 
Freiheit und Eigentum, 247, in: GEMEINWOHL UND GEMEINSINN –HISTORISCHE SEMANTIKEN POLITISCHER 
LEITBEGRIFFE (Herfried Münkler & Harald Bluhm, eds,. 2001).  
 of the “acte administratif” 
50 See for the development in Germany Michael Stolleis, GESCHICHTE DES ÖFFENTLICHEN RECHTS IN 
DEUTSCHLAND, VOL 2: 1800 – 1914, 410 et seq. (1992): the concept had found its contours only at the end of the 
19th century; the same goes for France, cf. Philippe Belaval, Foreword, in: Cédric Milhat, L’ACTE ADMINISTRATIF: 
ENTRE PROCESSUS ET PROCEDURES 7 (2007).  
51 In a theoretical perspective see Pierre Macherey, PETITS RIENS. ORNIÈRES ET DERIVES DU QUOTIDIEN 21 (2009); 
id., DE CANGUILHEM À FOUCAULT. LA FORCE DES NORMES 77 (2009). 
52 The focus of German (and French) administrative law on the Verwaltungsakt (“acte administratif”) is said to have 
focused on state intervention and to have neglected the role of the administration in the development of benefits 
administration and infrastructure in particular, Kersten & Lenski, supra, note 9, at 504; but this is far from 
convincing because the American evolution follows the same track without being focused on the “administrative 
act”, Mashaw, supra, note 7. 
53 Otto Mayer, DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSRECHT, Vol. I, 95 (1914). 
54 Več, supra, note 46, 281; Erk-Volkmar Heyen, Deutschland, in: GESCHICHTE DER 
VERWALTUNGSRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT IN EUROPA 29, 32 (id., ed., 1982); H. Berthélémy, TRAITÉ DE DROIT 
ADMINISTRATIF ÉLÉMENTAIRE, 8th ed., 354 et seq. (1916) for the regulation of „installations classées”. 
55 It is not a coincidence that one of the founders of modern public law in Germany, Carl Friedrich von Gerber 
(GRUNDZÜGE EINES SYSTEMS DES DEUTSCHEN STAATSRECHTS, 2nd ed., 1869) was first a private lawyer; his focus 
on the “will power” (“Willensmacht”) of the state and its putative “blindness” to political goal finds its reverse side 
in the openness toward the observation of the social dynamic of a liberal society; see also Carsten Kremer, DIE 
WILLENSMACHT DES STAATES. DIE GEMEINDEUTSCHE STAATSRECHTSLEHRE DES CARL FRIEDRICH VON GERBER, 
296 (2008) (for the relationship between goals and “willpower”). 
56 The work by Reimund Schmidt-De Caluwe, DER VERWALTUNGSAKT IN DER LEHRE OTTO MAYERS 63 et seq. 
(1999) and Michael Stolleis, GESCHICHTE DES ÖFFENTLICHEN RECHTS IN DEUTSCHLAND, Vol. II, 332 et seq. (1992) 
overstate the political connotation of the emerging German administrative law in the 19th century and neglect its 
internal rationality; more differentiated Thomas von Danwitz, VERWALTUNGSRECHTLICHES SYSTEM UND 
EUROPÄISCHE INTEGRATION 31 et seq. (1996); Roger Müller, VERWALTUNGSRECHT ALS WISSENSCHAFT,FRITZ 
FLEINER 1867 – 1937, 100 (2006). 
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(Verwaltungsakt) should not be taken at face value; it is an extremely modern instrument that 
that has demonstrated its flexibility even under postmodern conditions of complexity.58
 
 It is a 
form of a flexible public intervention that corresponds to the character of the positivist law 
“without a goal” of its own. 
The “acte administratif” has both an external function (in the limitation of subjective rights) and 
an internal function which allows administration to process rational decision-making on a case-
by-case mode59 from which a structure emerges which can be deciphered both by the 
administrative practitioners themselves and by private actors. If this process is not in line with 
the experience diffused and reproduced by society, and if it comes into conflict with the rights 
of the private actors, it can be controlled by courts with reference to the rationality of the 
decision-making process itself. This conflict gives courts the opportunity to re-process the 
“actes administratifs” in a network of judicial decisions with a view to the legitimate 
expectations which can be formulated and further processed upon the basis of the “rights” of 
private actors. In this way, the “acte administratif” is “re-coded” as an infringement in personal 
rights while, at the same time, it is processed in the administrative decision-making procedures 
which contribute to the stabilisation of the impersonal inter-relationships60 which allow for the 
self-organisation of society. This evolution corresponds to the rise of “realism”, a social ideology 
that challenges the holistic conceptions of German idealism and opens a perspective on the 
dynamic of “will power as the point of departure for a new construction of society – as distinct 
from tradition.61
 
 
Here, we are confronted with the blind spot of the legal system, which demonstrates difficulties 
in acknowledging the process-like acentric character of the evolution of its own frames of 
reference. It is not by coincidence that Philippe Belaval, a member of the French Conseil d’Etat, 
in his preface to a book on the modern use of the “acte administratif” refers to the “plurality of 
the architects” of the concept62
                                                                                                                                                             
57 The focus on willpower fits in the general trend towards a social-darwinian “vitalism” as a far spread everyday 
philosophy in Germany that is neither liberal in a political sense nor democratic but not antimodern; see Jürgen 
Große, LEBENSPHILOSOPHIE 89, 101 (2010), where the momentary expression of willpower in response to a 
situation is highlighted. 
 - a view that pre-supposes that the elements of architectural 
58 Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Die Zukunft des Verwaltungsakts, 86 VERWALTUNGSARCHIV 511 (1995)..  
59 Marcel Gauchet, L’Etat au miroir de la raison d’Etat: La France et la chrétienté, in: RAISON ET DERAISON D’ETAT 
193, 237 (Yves-Charles Zarka, ed.,1 994). 
60 Douglass C. North, John J. Wallis & Barry R. Weingast, VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL ORDERS: A CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR INTERPRETING RECORDED SOCIAL HISTORY 261 (2009). 
61 See the wonderful book by Jacques Le Rider, L’ALLEMAGNE AU TEMPS DU RÉALISME. DE L’ESPOIR AU 
DÉSENCHANTEMENT 1848 – 1890, 33, 46, 52 (2008).  
62 Belaval, supra, note 50, 7.  
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design are pre-determined and given.63 From a postmodern perspective that takes into 
consideration the approaches of comparative research in literature which try to describe the 
text as a paradoxical effect of an anonymous intertextuality, the co-presence of other texts 
which interfere with the production of meaning beyond the will of the author,64 one might get 
an idea of how basic concepts of public law such as the “acte administratif” (Verwaltungsakt) in 
continental European law can only be regarded as the result of a process that writes itself 
within an “environment of possibilities” (“environnement des possibles”).65 It is the emergent 
product of a discontinuous process of variation of cases, the stabilisation of “local equilibria”, 
and of transcending them in crises and of the search for new “local equilibria”.66 Certain 
possibilities are given up, others are retained and interwoven in a multitude of inclusive options 
and exclusive constraints.67 This inter-disciplinary approach sheds some light on the distribution 
of competencies between administration, administrative courts and the legislator. The focus on 
legitimation is misleading, because it tends to reduce the processing of the administrative act to 
its “would-be” origin in the Ancien Régime and to oppose it to the democratic will as the only 
acceptable source of legitimation. Without a “discursive memory” that links - in retrospect - the 
distributed intertextuality of the implicit68 construction of a basic legal institution to a 
prospective generative dimension within a domain of options that is only - to a limited extent - 
the object of explicit design, a productive role of the legislation is inconceivable.69
 
 
                                                 
63 See from a perspective of the humanities Michel Charles, INTRODUCTION À L’ÉTUDE DES TEXTES 221 (1995). 
64 Gérard Genette, PALIMPSESTES. LA LITERATURE AU SECOND DEGRÉ 8 (1982). 
65 Charles, supra, note 63, 102. 
66 Charles, supra, note 63, 102. 
67 This reference to the acentric intertextuality of the selftransformation of law may in fact be more adequate to 
legal theory than the focus on “evolution” which can only be used in a more or less metaphorical way because 
there is no functional equivalent to genes in the legal system; see for the observation of oscillatory processes at 
the “borders” of the legal system Fabian Steinhauer, GERECHTIGKEIT ALS ZUFALL. ZUR RHETORISCHEN EVOLUTION 
DES RECHTS 94 (2007); Marc Amstutz, EVOLUTORISCHES WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 271 et seq. (2001); Gunther 
Teubner, AUTOPOIETIC LAW: A NEW APPROACH TO LAW AND SOCIETY 221et seq., 226 (1988) (the focus on 
“pattern prediction” still remains vague and is ignorant of selftransformation processes that the system cannot 
control), Niklas Luhmannn, DIE GESELLSCHAFT DER GESELLSCHAFT, Vol. 1, 549 (1997) takes the view that the 
“evolution of ideas” is context dependent and does not underlie the control by argumentation – what this means 
for the evolution of system remains unclear; critically Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STANFORD 
LAW REVIEW 57, 81 (1984); also Lawrence Rosen, LAW AS CULTURE 56 et seq. (2006). 
68 Michael Polanyi, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE. TOWARDS A POST-CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY (1998). 
69 This does not mean that no radical reform is possible because the model that could only be briefly sketched 
cannot exclude that search processes end in a lock-in that blocks any productive experimentation; see the paper 
by Daron Acemoglu, Davide Cantoni, Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, The Consequences of Radical Reform: 
The French Revolution, Discussion Paper 2010, http://econ-www.mit.edu/files/5644 (arguing plausibly that the 
Napoleonic reforms introduced in several German territories at the beginning of the 19th century had lasting 
positive effects on the economic development. 
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This is why the requirement of a democratic legitimation for both private and public law can 
only be acknowledged to a very limited extent.70 The administrative law of the “society of 
individuals” is closely linked to the logic of private law and its reference to the self-organisation 
of differentiated societal systems (the economy in particular). It introduces a similar logic into 
public law because its cognitive frame of reference is now the society and its practical 
knowledge basis and not “police science” as in the past.71 Police power, which is the core of 
administrative decision-making, refers to a societal dynamic conception of the “normality”72 – 
not to factual tradition and not to a privileged knowledge possessed by the state.73 However, 
the close link between the normative and cognitive elements of the definition and the 
protection of “public order” is preserved,74 even though it has to be observed and reflected in a 
much more sophisticated mode than in the past.75 This is all the more the case because 
knowledge takes on a dynamic character itself76
                                                 
70 See Ralph Michaels, Umdenken für die UNIDROIT Prinzipien: Vom Rechtswahlstatut zum Allgemeinen Teil des 
transnationalen Vertragsrechts, 73 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES 
PRIVATRECHT 866 (2009).  
 - in the same vein as the law. The state makes 
itself “understandable” by laying open the knowledge base which it wants to establish for 
71 Bohlender, supra, note 49; the mostly smaller German states in the late 17th and early 18th century had tried to 
epitomise an administrative rationality as the legitimation basis of public power, Yves-Charles Zarka, PHILOSOPHIE 
ET POLITIQUE À L’ÂGE CLASSIQUE 158 (1998); Michel Senellart, LES ARTS DE GOUVERNER. DU REGIME MEDIEVAL 
AU CONCEPT DE GOUVERNEMENT 282 (1995); id., “Juris peritus, id est politicus”? Bodin et les théoritiens 
allemands de la prudence civile politique au XVIIe siècle, 201, 216 et seq., in: JEAN BODIN. NATURE, HISTOIRE, 
DROIT ET POLITIQUE (Yves-Charles Zarka, ed.,1996) this allowed for the development of a compromise between an 
approached which remained focused on the state and an approach which described the state as a function of 
society. Because of the rise of a fragmented “special knowledge” as a basis for public decision making it seems 
doubtful that the concept of “police science” can be revitalized under conditions of postmodernity, See however 
the contributions in: THE NEW POLICE SCIENCE. THE POLICE POWER IN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 
GOVERNANCE (Markus D. Dubber & Mariana Valverde, eds., 2006). 
72 See the famous “Kreuzberg”-judgment of the Prussian Higher Administrative Court (Oberverwaltungsgericht) of 
June 14th, 1882, Reports (OVGE)) Vol. 9, 353; See Volkmar Götz, ALLGEMEINES POLIZEI- UND ORDNUNGSRECHT, 
13th ed., 18 (2001); for the historical development in France, in particular the flexibility of the emerging police law 
see Paolo Napoli, NAISSANCE DE LA POLICE MODERNE: POUVOIRS , NORMES, SOCIÉTÉ 15 (2003). 
73 Bohlender, supra, note 49; for the US see T. R. Powell, Administrative Exercise of the Police Power, 24 HARVARD 
LAW REVIEW 268 (1911); for France Senellart, supra, note 48. 
74 Paolo Napoli, Misura di polizia. Un approccio storicoconcettuale in età moderna, 44 QUADERNI STORIC I 523 
(2009). 
75 For the broad conception of “police” in the ancien regime See Pasquale Pasquino, THEORIES OF THE STATE IN 
EARLY-MODERN EUROPE 42, 61, in: Dubber & Valverde (eds.), supra, note 71.  
76 One element of the new coordination between state and society in the 19th century is the rise of statistics and its 
use by both public and private actors: Theodore M. Porter, Lawless Society: Social Science and the Reinterpretation 
of Statistics in Germany, 1850–1880, 351, in: THE PROBABILISTIC REVOLUTION , VOL. 1 (Lorenz Krüger, Lorraine J. 
Daston & Michael Heidelberger, eds.,1987). 
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administration77 and the world has to be made calculable.78 “Experience” is based upon self-
transformation of society as is the legal system.79 This new perspective changes the status or 
the rule in general: it is generated “bottom up” from individual behaviour, and not from a 
totalising point of view,80 which would be incompatible with the experimental order 
established by private law. This new dynamism comes to the fore both in police law, which 
observes the new economic and technical dynamism referring to the distinction of 
“danger”/normality (in conformity with experience), and models its “control project” on the 
patterns of the societal self-understanding of technology (control of steam engines, gas 
containers, safety of buildings, etc.).81 The “normal” is not dangerous.82
 
 The same is true for 
private law where, for example, the requirements of the conclusion of a contract or the 
definition of “negligent” (unlawful) behaviour refer to experience emerging in society. 
The state even intervenes in the activities to distribute experience in society when its 
knowledge remains restricted to local or regional communities. It presses for the establishment 
of private self-organised organisations which are meant to evaluate and promote experience 
which can be regarded as reliable (Technischer Überwachungsverein, TÜV, Verein Deutscher 
Ingenieure , VDI, etc.). 83 This shows that the legal system cannot be onlycognitively open on a 
case-to-case basis and adhere to stable legal rules at the general level: there is a continuous 
exchange between a normalised societal experience which is increasingly formulated in 
technical rules for the construction of machinery, or the construction of buildings. And both 
private law and public law have to refer to this “normal” knowledge” when it comes to the 
question of whether damage (caused by the explosion of a gas container, for example) was to 
be attributed to “negligence” (ex post) or whether it had to be regarded as “dangerous” by 
police (ex ante). This does not mean that the economic system or technology impose certain 
rules on the legal system and call its self-construction into question – not at all. Legal rules 
cannot be processed without a reference to societal rules and the self-generated “internal law” 
of administration84
                                                 
77 Marcel Gauchet, L’Etat au miroir de la raison d’Etat: La France et la chrétienté,193, 237 in: RAISON ET DERAISON 
D’ETAT (Yves-Charles Zarka, ed.,1994). 
 – this constitutive link between recurring patterns of behaviour in society 
78 Alain Desrosières, THE POLITICS OF LARGE NUMBERS. A HISTORY OF STATISTICAL REASONING (1998); François 
Ewald, L’ETAT PROVIDENCE (1986); Theodore J. Porter, THE RISE OF STATISTICAL THINKING (1986). 
79 Alexandre Lefebvre, THE IMAGE OF LAW. DELEUZE, BERGSON, SPINOZA 15 (2008). 
80 Claude Gauthier, L’INVENTION DE LA SOCIÉTÉ CIVILE 233 (1993). 
81 The police power as a “governmental practice” of the state preserves its forms but it exchanges the cognitive 
schemes it draws on; see Paolo Napoli, “Police”. La conceptualisation d’un modele juridico-politique sous l’Ancien 
Régime, 20 DROITS 183 (1994) and 21 DROITS 151 (1995). 
82 Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Coping With Uncertainty: Ecological Risks and the Proceduralisation of Environmental Law, 
299, in: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ECOLOGICAL RESPONSIBILITY: THE CONCEPT AND PRACTICE OF ECOLOGICAL 
SELF-ORGANIZATION (Gunther Teubner, Lindsay Farmer & Declan Murphy, eds., 1994). 
83 Wolf, supra, note 46. 
84 Mashaw, supra, note 7, 1413, 1461; the concept goes back to Bruce Wyman, THE PRINCIPLES OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW GOVERNING THE RELATIONS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS (1903). 
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and the normative patterns which have to be constructed, observed and tested in the legal 
system is essential to the legal rationality.85
 
 This does not mean that normal knowledge is just 
blindly introduced into the legal system. On the contrary, the legal system can, and has to, 
observe whether these practical rules are sufficient, reliable, have to be modified upon the 
basis of new experience, etc. Normality and normativity are closely linked, and this link is 
continuously observed, revised and re-modelled. 
Administrative law is driven by two contradictory forces: on the one hand, the administrative 
agents behave as a “community of experimentalists”,86 which operates with a kind of implicit 
horizontal linking from case-to-case, whereas courts, on the other hand, have a tendency 
towards a type of explicit conceptual re-coding, which tries to limit the processes of self-
organisation that are necessarily inherent in the administrative practice. There is a permanent 
interplay between these two types of internal and external stabilisation of the administrative 
legal process. However, it would be superficial to regard the judicial practice as the creator of 
the institutions of administrative law.87 Its stabilisation is the outcome of a co-operative 
process which is only moulded in statute law much later. This process can be regarded as a 
distributed evolutionary process88 which draws upon the different functions of administration 
and judiciary.89 The autonomy of the “relational rationality” of administrative decision-making 
should not be derived from “expertise”90 in a stricter analytical sense, but is due to the 
evolutionary character of the dynamic self-transformation of society: this evolutionary process 
which subsumes administrative law to a permanent unrest from which new patterns and 
instruments of decision-making are generated can be described as drawing on an “abductive” 
approach (following the terminology of Charles S. Peirce)91 which is a reasoning that creates a 
new meaning from the observation of “cases” and conflicting rationales, and leads to a 
broadening perspective on the societal pool of variety beyond the possibility of inferring a new 
stable rule that can be “applied”.92
                                                 
85 Lefebvre, supra, note 79, 59. 
 It is more a kind of a “move” within a game with incomplete 
86 See generally Peter Ochs, Peirce, PRAGMATISM AND THE LOGIC OF SCRIPTURE 107 (1998).  
87 Mashaw, supra note 7, 1378.  
88 See Müller, supra, note 56, 86 in particular; generally Wolfgang Meyer-Hesemann, METHODENWANDEL IM 
VERWALTUNGSRECHT (1981). 
89 See for a critique of the Chevron-approach Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration: 
How Chevron Misconceives the the Function of Agencies and Why it Matters, 59 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW 
673, 677 (2007). 
90 See for this argument Long Island Care at Home Ltd. v. Coke, S. Ct. 127 2339, 2346-47 (2007). 
91 Christiane Chauviré, Peirce et la signification. Introduction à la logique du vague 201 (1995).  
92 See in defense of the rationality of administrative decision making Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the 
Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry into Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW 501 
(2005). 
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rules which emerge from the game itself. This is a logic of incompleteness that is not accessible 
from a control-project which epitomises conformity to rules. 
 
But to describe administrative law and its institutions in the 19th century as judge-made law 
misses the point: it is mainly an autonomous product of administration itself both in Europe 
and the US:  
“The structures and processes of administrative adjudication were designed and built 
almost entirely by the administrative agencies themselves.”93
 
  
This is true also for the US: Jerry L. Mashaw has epitomised the generation of “trans-
substantive” internal rules of decision-making by administrative decision-makers in the 19th 
century.94 For the US, it is quite characteristic that the existence of much of this earlier 
administrative law was even denied at all,95 mainly because it did not fit in the model of 
accountability and legitimacy of law. The US administrative law is not based upon a focal 
construction like the French and German “acte administratif” (“Verwaltungsakt”); however, it is 
also centred on the search for the adequate forms of intervention into individual rights and the 
processes of self-organisation that their use unleashes.96
 
 
C. INTERMEDIARY REMARKS ON THE EMBEDDEDNESS OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN THE “EPISTEMIC 
KNOWLEDGE BASE” OF SOCIETY 
 
Historians of social and economic institutions, such as Joel Mokyr, have underlined - with good 
reasons - the hypothesis that one should not over-estimate the role of formal institutions in the 
evolution of modern western societies.97 Cultural beliefs and self-enforcing practices of trust-
building and reputation were at least as important as formal institutions.98 The complex legal 
system is rooted in a broader “epistemic knowledge base”. We will see later that the one-sided 
perspective on the legal system in the stricter sense leads to futile questions on what the legal 
nature of “global administrative law” really is.99
                                                 
93 Mashaw, supra, note 7. 
 This approach either leads to the fixation of a 
traditional static concept of law or the problematical assumption that a global civil society can 
94 Mashaw, supra, note 7, 1377, 1466. 
95 Mashaw, supra, note 7, 1378.  
96 Frank J. Goodnow, COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 6 et seq., 371 et seq. (1905). 
97 Joel Mokyr, INSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, 4, 22 (2008). 
98 Avner Greif, INSTITUTIONS AND THE PATH TO MODERNITY: LESSONS FROM MEDIEVAL TRADE (2006); Douglass 
C. North, UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC CHANGE (2010). 
99 See only Kingsbury, supra, note 9; for the relationships between global administrative law and traditional 
international law Sabino Cassese, B. Carotti, L. Casini, M. Macchia, E. Macdonald & M. Savino, GLOBAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. CASES, MATERIALS, ISSUES, 2nd ed., p. XXV www.iilj.org,  
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be regarded as generating and “constitutionalising” its own legal system beyond the state.100 
The focus should, instead, be on the permanent unrest inherent in the experimental acentric 
order of (post-) modern society which introduces an evolutionary “drift”101
 
 into the cultural 
memory of society, which is also a challenge for the legal system, because there is a close inter-
relationship between the cognitive and the normative rationality of society. 
The knowledge order of society was (and is) constituted in a way which not only differentiates 
between general knowledge (“in the books” and in practical experience) and privately 
appropriated information (legally-protected by patents or practical processes of keeping know-
how secret in firms) but also left open a broad range of operations of freely-sharing information 
(which seems to be regarded by many protagonists of the internet world as something 
completely new – which is definitely not the case). Robert C. Allen calls this phenomenon 
“collective invention”102 which includes, for example, the spread of the steam engine as a basic 
innovation of the 19th century. Especially in the UK and later also in Germany and other 
countries, social conventions and “self-enforcing modes of behaviour”103 were much more 
important for the stabilisation of the legal system than the formal adjudication by independent 
judges in ividual cases of conflict. It is quite characteristic that the goals of policing in Germany 
included the preservation of “public order” (as opposed to “public security”104 in the narrower 
sense) i.e., the observation of the “appropriate” behaviour in public and the respect for social 
conventions (below the level of formal law) such as disciplined and controlled self-presentation 
in public including basic norms of politeness, clothing, cleaning, sexuality,105
 
 etc. 
These remarks should have made it clear that, in the “society of individuals”106
 
 of the 19th 
century, both public and private law were based upon complex layers of social knowledge, 
conventions and professional practices, all of which were enshrined in the public order at large 
or in social and technical experience. Without reference to this cognitive infrastructure, neither 
private nor administrative decision-making can be understood. 
                                                 
100 for a critique see also Möllers, supra, note 25, 329; Christian Tietje, Transnationales Wirtschaftsrecht aus 
öffentlich-rechtlicher Perspektive, 101 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR VERGLEICHENDE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 404, 418 (2002); 
Rost, supra, note 35, 87. 
101 Francisco J. Varela, Evan Thompson & Eleanor Rosch, THE EMBODIED MIND: SCIENCE AND HUMAN EXPERIENCE 
200 (1993) 
102 Robert C. Allen, Collective Invention, 4 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 1 (1983); Mokyr, supra, note 97, at 
22. 
103 Mokyr, ibid., 12. 
104 For Germany see Volkmar Götz, ALLGEMEINES POLIZEI- UND ORDNUNGSRECHT, 13th ed., 43 (2001). 
105 See for the policing of prostitution Jacques Berlière, LA POLICE DES MOEURS SOUS LA IIIE RÉPUBLIQUE (1992). 
106 Nobert Elias, supra, note 11. 
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The “administrative act” was, as seen in the perspective opened here, not a relict of the 
absolutist state, but a modern instrument of rationalising administrative practices and of co-
ordination between the society of the individuals and the preservation of “public order”.107
 
It 
turns it into the new experimental order that can no longer draw on a fixed set of rules and 
traditions. Its new form is a product of the evolutionary “drift” of the development of 
administrative law, which can only ex post be stabilised by “judge made law” or later by the 
legislator. 
D. THE SECONDARY RE-MODELLING OF THE TRADITIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SOCIETY OF 
THE INDIVIDUALS 
 
The exchange process between the law and the structured practical networks which generate 
and distribute societal experience is in constant flux.108 A distinction has to be made between 
the continuous flow of information which emerges from the permanent variation within 
societal knowledge basis, and the momentary suspension of normality by the rise of new 
factual paradigms which induce a kind of “break of symmetry” in the inter-relationship between 
technical normal knowledge and the feedback loops which have to be designed within the legal 
network of networks. This was, for example, the case when the knowledge process became 
more dynamic and, as a consequence, the concept of normality had to be re-framed: 
increasingly, this dynamic is reflected in the legal system when the question is raised as to 
whether bigger firms have a duty to take an active part in the creation of knowledge and are no 
longer allowed just to adapt to the current “state of the art”109
 
 or when (in administrative law) 
the orientation on experience and “danger” (in the end: damage) is at stake. 
The hitherto central unilateral administrative decision is in decline – not only in global 
administrative law. Things get more complicated to judge if one bears in mind that this is also 
true for domestic law. At the global level in particular, not only informal measures and 
procedures take the lead over the “acte administratif” as expression of the internal sovereignty 
of the state, but also the norms which are referred to in global law are mainly not legal norms 
which are part of international public law, but factual standards or, if one may put it this way, 
self-organised “norms in being”, procedural rules in particular.  
 
The same goes for the concept of “person” as a cornerstone of the liberal positive legal order: 
this concept draws on the stability of roles and the attribution of future-oriented expectations 
to legal actors abstracted from the stability of tradition.110
                                                 
107 Gauchet, supra, note 77. 
 Once the person is supplemented by 
108 For an overview of the function of the “Verwaltungsakt” in present day German administrative law see Christian 
Bumke, Verwaltungsakte, 1031, in: GRUNDLAGEN DES VERWALTUNGSRECHTS, VOL. 2 (Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, 
Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann & Andreas Voßkuhle , eds., 2008).  
109 For the different bridging concepts that are used for the transfer of knowledge into the legal system see Ladeur, 
supra, note 83.  
110 Irène Théry, LA DISTINCTION DE SEXE: UNE NOUVELLE APPROCHE DE L’EGALITE 384 et seq. (2010). 
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the organisation and – recently – by networks of relationship, one may assume that the 
fundamental relevance of the person has changed, as well. The role of the person is mediated 
by its position in organisations and networks.111 Expectations can be multi-faceted under both 
conditions of complexity112 and the dynamic of self-transcendence of liberal society. This 
dynamic allows for a new type of reflexivity of the legal order, which can operate with an open 
linkage between norms in the stricter sense and a whole range of different types of “social 
norms”,113 which, in the past, remained more or less hidden in the administrative practices.114
 
 
Both components of the normative order are permeable for a reflexive acentric modelling of 
“expectations of expectations” both by and between organisations that have more strategic 
potential, in as much as they can construct longer chains of actions. 
The new reflexivity gives sufficient space for a “management of rules” which re-models the 
distinction between legal and factual norms: the spontaneous character is replaced more and 
more by explicit “standards” that demonstrate a new fragmentation and heterogeneity within 
the social knowledge base: experience based knowledge has to distinguished from the “best 
available knowledge”,115 in particular. Knowledge is further dynamised. This development 
includes the necessity to find procedural meta-norms for the observation of the new versions of 
the “loops” between both types of rules because there are, of course, problems which raise the 
question of how a norm has to be characterised: this is the case when the rights of persons who 
did not participate in the creation of the norm are infringed. However, this is not often to be 
assumed, because, in the society of organisations,116
 
 persons are, in many constellations, 
legally represented by organisations or are subsumed under new general patterns of 
expectations beyond the classical “no harm” principle (for example, protection by public 
insurance, transformation of liability, including strict liability, the creation of group rights, such 
as the rights of workers and consumers). Often, no external effect of norms can be observed 
because it is only the general framework of decision-making that is touched by an 
organisational process. Many social norms are more a kind of functional equivalent to the 
process of self-construction of experience as a collective, distributed knowledge base. 
                                                 
111 The reverse side is to be seen in the fact that the natural person as opposed to the “legal person” in the stricter 
sense has also been transformed: Increasingly norms are integrated into the legal system that refer to the 
individual “personality” as the object of care and assistance. 
112 Théry, ibid., 140. 
113 It is not a coincidence that at the beginning of the 20th century neither doctrine nor legislation had taken much 
account of the relationship between legal and social norms, Več, supra, note 46, 281. 
114 Calliess & Zumbansen, supra, note 24, 250 et seq. 
115 For the meaning of this and other bridging concepts in environmental law see Ladeur, supra, note 83.. 
116 For the concept see James S. Coleman, Social Structure and a Theory of Action, in: Peter M. Blau (ed.), 
APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF SOCIAL STRUCTURES (Peter M. Blau, ed., 1975) 76; Charles S. Perrow, COMPLEX 
ORGANIZATIONS. A CRITICAL ESSAY, 3rd ed. (1986). 
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The more complex type of administrative decision-making that comes to the fore in the 
domains of planning, high technology (nuclear power, genetic engineering) and risk, in 
particular, demonstrate that the construction of a balancing decision in these fields is not 
equivalent to the classical type of a judgment based upon a “statutory interpretation”.117
 
 This 
was the basis for the German legal conception of a structured process of planning that 
distinguishes the stable and the creative elements of decision-making. More often than not, the 
difference between public and private decision-making is not so fundamental: in both cases, 
the underlying legal norms are (mainly) not applied (when one can speak about a realm of 
discretion) but are referred to as limits to a self-organised practice of administration or a public-
private “joint venture”. 
The interplay between administrative decision-making and the law is historically changing: the 
external legislative norm or the judicial decision-making processes can exercise their stabilising 
role once a certain “internal” administrative practice has settled in a rule-like manner, while, in 
times of transformation, administrative horizontal-heterarchical approaches of processing from 
case-to-case in a creative way tend to experiment with new forms of administrative operation 
that do not follow rule-like patterns. This is creative function which one may call the 
“modernising mission”, which David A. Strauss118
 
 attributes - with good reason - to the 
judiciary, but which includes - in a differentiated way - the administration, as well. 
One has to accept that, from the outset, the public dimension of technical (and, later on, the 
more complex technological) risks and the private process of production are entangled. 
Technologies in postmodern society are more dependent on complex design and are “hybrid”, 
in as much as they often pre-suppose the development of a whole domain of options including 
far reaching potential side-effects on third parties or on human values (nuclear power, 
genetically modified organisms, nano-technology, etc.). However, technological questions have 
always had a societal dimension.119
 
 
In environmental law,120 the pivotal role of the practical experience based upon the 
observation of damage is called into question,121
                                                 
117 See for Germany Rainer Wahl, Herausforderungen und Antworten: Das Öffentliche Recht der letzten fünf 
Jahrzehnte 43, 51 (2006). 
 and the control project for high technology 
trajectories has to be adapted to risk management and the precautionary principle, upon which 
118 The Modernizing Mission of Judiciary Review, 76 CHICAGO LAW REVIEW 859, 894 (2009). 
119 Frank Fischer, DEMOCRACY AND EXPERTISE. REORIENTING POLICY INQUIRY 143 et seq. (2009) 
120 Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 74 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 1495 
(1999); id & Maria H. Ivanova, Revitalizing Global Environmental Governance: A Function-Driven Approach, 181, in: 
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE: OPTIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES (id., eds., 2002); Oran R. Young, 
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT IN A STATELESS SOCIETY (1994); Daniel 
Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International Environmental law?, 
93 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 596 (1999). 
121 Karl-Heinz Ladeur, The Introduction of the Precautionary Principe into Ec Law – A Pyrrhic Victory for 
Environmental and Public Health law?, 40 COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 1455 (2003). 
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it is based. For our perspective, it is important to bear in mind that these deep transformations 
within the technological networks and the legal network of practices which try to learn from 
them find their repercussion in the legal system, albeit only partially. 
 
One of its major transformations is to be seen – from the “cognitivist” point of view taken here, 
i.e., the observation of the emergence and transformation of rules and institutions as elements 
of a societal memory – in the rise of the groups and organisations as the actors and as the 
generators of new types of knowledge in particular: the increasing importance of probabilities, 
groups with statistical regularities, the evolution of technologies of production and 
management (“expert knowledge” 122 as opposed to distributed “experience” based upon 
action and upon the observation of its consequences) have had a strong impact even on 
administrative law. However, it would be an illusion to reduce the new discretionary power 
gained by reference to expertise to a mere delegation of power by parliament.123
 
 
E. GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AS THE PRODUCT OF ADMINISTRATIVE EXPERIMENTATION … AND 
ITS JUDICIALISATION 
 
Upon the basis of the theoretical reflections given above, one should, first of all, bear in mind 
that administrative law could not and cannot be conceived of as being mainly a product of the 
legislator. The same is valid for private law. Both legal domains are characterised by the 
challenge of enabling processes to cope with the fundamental uncertainty and the dynamic of 
the self-transformation of society and to generate forms of binding them in order to allow for 
co-operation, co-ordination, and learning. Both the development of the administrative law of 
the “society of the individuals” and the successive administrative law of the “society of 
organisations” could only be the emergent product of primarily administrative experimentation 
and of the retention of successful forms of action124 including the increasing importance of 
procedure125 as a resource for the creation126
                                                 
122 Burkard Wollenschläger, WISSENSGENERIERUNG IM VERFAHREN (2009). 
 and combination of knowledge for decision-
123 This is the view taken by Kenneth Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms, Decision Making and 
Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE LAW JOURNAL 377 (2006). 
124 See generally for the autonomy of administration Edward L. Rubin, It’s Time to Make the Administrative 
Procedure Act Administrative, 89 CORNELL LAW REVIEW 95 (2002) (claiming that administrative law is too narrowly 
following the patterns of judicial decision making); in a German perspective Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, Die 
Eigenständigkeit der Verwaltung, in: GRUNDLAGEN DES VERWALTUNGSRECHTS, Vol. 1, § 10 No. 13 (Eberhard 
Schmidt- Aßmann & Andreas Voßkuhle, eds., 2006); for the legitimation of administrative agencies, Hans-Heinrich 
Trute, Die Legitimation der Verwaltung, ibid., § 7, 307. 
125 The role of procedure in administrative law should not be regarded as an illegitimate “ersatz” for appropriate 
democratic hierarchical empowerment, it is a necessary component of a procedural rationality of decision making 
which has to meet the challenge of uncertainty, see also Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational 
Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law, 115 YALE LAW JOURNAL 1490 (2006). 
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making processes.127 Both in the private industry and in public administration, the use of 
experience as the common societal knowledge basis was no longer sufficient.128 It is not by 
accident that, in a country such as Germany, since the early 1960s, a continuous process of 
broadening the scope of judicial control over the whole domain of the administration, which, in 
the past, had been reserved for non-legal administrative rationality (schools, status of public 
staff).129 In the same vein, discretion has been increasingly judicialised.130 As in the US, in 
Germany, too, there has been a permanent broadening of the acceptable arguments in legal 
controversies: more and more public decision-making is not only subject to strict control upon 
the basis of specific legal arguments, but also reference to the “principle of proportionality”131 
or a broad understanding of constitutional liberties (which include “principles of protection” 
beyond the traditional conception of negative liberties) are commonplace today. This evolution 
is hailed by many as a phenomenon of “legalisation” of factual power.132 Upon closer 
inspection, this view appears to be superficial because it neglects the decline of the impact of 
the self-organised knowledge base and the set of social conventions which defined a collective 
understanding of a “common sake” of the public ,133
                                                                                                                                                             
126 Lefebvre, supra, note 79, 254, for the creative role of legal decisions.  
 while bargaining processes regarding the 
right of the individual upon an ad hoc basis have increasingly come to replace this collective 
element of the conventional infrastructure of the law as described above. This is, so to speak, 
the dark side of the change of paradigms in society: the emergent “society of organisations” 
tends to keep its rationality more or less invisible. Once self reflexive bargaining processes 
come into place which undermine the universalistic character of the liberal legal order, and the 
127 For the U. S. administrative law in the 19th century this autonomous role of administration and the creation of 
its own “internal law” is epitomised in Mashaw, supra, note 7; 1413, 1461. 
128 See for the evolution of the knowledge basis of public decision making Karl-Heinz Ladeur, The Postmodern 
Condition of Law and Societal Management of Rules. Facts and Norms Revisited, 27 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 87 (2006).  
129 Again this does not differ much from the court restraint visa-vis administrative discretion in 19th century, 
Mashaw, supra, note 127. 
130 See Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration: How Chevron Misconceives the 
Fuction of Agencies and Why it Matters, 59 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW 673 (2007). 
131 Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism, 47 COLUMBIA 
JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW (2008), 72; Jacco Bomhoff, Genealogies of Balancing as Discourse, 4 LAW & 
ETHICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 108 (2010), available at http://www.bepress.com/lehr/vol4/iss1/art6; the principle has 
found a philosophical preparation in the German “materiale Wertethik” (Nicolai Hartmann and Max Scheler) which 
has attributed to the facticity of values a normative foundation in the subjective act of valuing, See Nicolai 
Hartmann, Das Wertproblem in der Philosophie der Gegenwart, in: KLEINERE SCHRIFTEN, 327 (1958), where the 
“type of situation” and its framing by the time of its emergence is regarded as essential for the attribution of 
values; Robert Spaemann, SCHRITTE ÜBER UNS HINAUS. GESAMMELTE REDEN UND AUFSÄTZE, VOL. I 90 (2010); 
for a critique see also Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Das Bundesverfassungsgericht als ‘Bürgergericht’?, 31 RECHTSTHEORIE 
267, 76 (2000). 
132 For its development see Eric Engle, The History of the General Principle of Proportionality: An Overview, July 
2009, available at ssrn. 
133 Myriam Revault d’Allonnes, LE POUVOIR DES COMMENCEMENTS. ESSAI SUR L’AUTORITÉ 59 et seq. (2006). 
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borderline of the “no harm” principle134 loses its cognitive and normative function (for 
example, the attribution of personal responsibility) any interest might re-enter the procedure 
of rule-making and put the bindingness of law at risk.135
 
 
This decline is a repercussion of the emergence of a new paradigm of the legal infrastructure, 
i.e., the rise of the “society of organisations”.136 Again. the focus here is not on the 
comprehensive re-construction of this new societal formation and the transformation of the 
legal system which it provokes. Instead, the focus will be on the change of the societal 
knowledge basis which is characterised by a split between, on the one hand, the continuity of 
the self-reproduction of general experience distributed over the whole of society, and, on the 
other, the advanced knowledge which is generated by the big organisations both in the 
economic and the broader sense (including political parties, unions etc.).137 This new type of 
technological knowledge in particular has a far-reaching impact on the laws concerning the 
protection of health and the environment, because they introduce a prospective strategy (“the 
precautionary principle”,138 “risk”, instead of experience based “danger”, the balancing of 
interests in planning law, etc.139). The differentiation of the new legal paradigm cannot be 
described in detail here.140 What is relevant for the intention of the present article is the 
hypothesis that both administrative action and judicial control change considerably – an 
assumption which does not rule out the continuity of the ongoing administrative practices of 
the past within a basic layer of decision-making on which a new layer of operations is super-
imposed It is structured by more complex and more sophisticated conventions and rules, which 
underlie a higher level of organised reflected observation,141
                                                 
134 Nadia Urbinati, MILL ON DEMOCRACY: FROM THE ATHENIAN POLIS TO REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 211 
(2002). 
 explicit formulation and revision: 
135 See also Ran Hirschl, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 212 (2009), where the increasing juridification of political questions is correlated with the 
waning of confidence in technocratic governance: the judicial institutions replace the lessening integration of 
society by social norms. 
136 See only Ladeur, supra, note 128. 
137 Ladeur, supra, note 128. 
138 See only for the precautionary principle Nicolas de Sadeleer, ENVIRONMENTAL PRINCIPLES: FROM POLITICAL 
SLOGANS TO LEGAL RULES 174 (2005). 
139 See Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion and Entrepreneurial 
Government, 75 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 1121 (2000). 
140 Karl-Heinz Ladeur, The Introduction of the Precautionary Principle into EC Law - A Pyrrhic Victory for 
Environmental and Public Health Law?, 40 COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 1455 (2003), and the critical 
commentary by Sebastian Wolf, Risk Regulation, Higher Rationality and the Death of Judicial Self-Restraint, 41 
COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 1125 (2004). 
141 See Eyal Benvenisti, Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Uses of Foreign and International Law by National 
Courts, 102 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 241, 260 (2008) for the problems related to the 
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more and more implicit conventions which were co-ordinated and administered by large 
professional associations (VDI etc.)142 are replaced by explicit “standards”143, and by private-
public organised decisions (in multiple forms).144 For the New Deal, it can be shown, as well, 
that the emergence of a new type of expertise-based administration, deference to a type of 
knowledge that originated from the organised processes of cognitive specialisation beyond the 
general level of distributed experience, led to a reduction of judicial control which was later on 
compensated145 – once the new structure had settled and was organised by a new paradigm – 
by new approaches to a closer control of procedure,146 instead of the substance of decision-
making. This shows that the participation of private parties in the regulatory process is 
inevitable147
 
 and legitimate, as was the case in the private generation of experience in the 
“society of the individuals”. 
One can summarise this evolution with the words of Noonan, Sabel and Simon148
                                                                                                                                                             
fragmentation of international environmental law: one way to deal with them consists in the reintegration of open 
principles of international law into the more elaborated structure of domestic environmental regulations.  
 as a transfer 
from “rule orientation” to the “formulation of plans”. This is, of course, a simplification, but it 
epitomises, with good arguments, the rise of a strategic component in both public and private 
decision-making: it is no longer the ideal of the continuity of the self-transformation of 
experience and the stability of public order which are both observed and preserved in a case-
by-case mode via individual decisions (“acte administratif”). Instead, decisions increasingly have 
to be made in prospective “chains” of a plurality of actions both at the same time level (co-
ordination of plans) and with a view to an increasingly uncertain future. This leads to more 
fragmentation within administration, an evolution which finds its expression in the rise of 
independent agencies in the US, in particular, or in a loosening of the inter-relationship 
between the processed singular decisions: the “administrative act” loses its role of co-
ordination among single decisions, while, at the same time, the fragmentation and the 
pluralisation of the types of decision-making rises. The focus on the processing of single acts 
and administrative discretion, on the one hand, and the observation and stabilisation of 
internal rules and doctrinal focal points as frames of reference in the processing of decisions on 
142 For the evolution see Wolf, supra, note 46; Več, supra, note 46. 
143 See the overview in Sabino Cassese, Global Standards for National Administrative Procedure, 68 LAW AND 
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 109 (2005). 
144 See the contributions in INTEGRATING SCIENTIFIC EXPERTISE INTO REGULATORY DECISION-MAKING (Christian 
Joerges, Karl-Heinz Ladeur & Ellen Vos, eds., 1997). 
145 Reuel Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence of New Deal Administrative Law, 106 
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 399 (2007). 
146 See in a political science perspective Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative 
Procedures as Political Control, 3 JOURNAL OF LAW, BUSINESS AND ORGANIZATION 243, 257 (1987). 
147 See Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 229 (2005). 
148 Legal Accountability in the Service based Welfare State, Columbia Public Law Discussion Paper 08-162 
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the other, vanishes and is replaced by the emergence of more loosely-coupled clusters149 and 
patterns of strategic comprehensive decision-making.150
 
 
The complexity of planning procedures, social insurance and social assistance, and the 
supervision of technologies which developed beyond the horizon of practical communities and 
led to the establishment of more professional communities of specific knowledge 
(“expertise”)151 could primarily only be tackled by 0 administration itself and not by steering 
laws.152
 
 
F. SOCIETY OF NETWORKS AND THE NETWORKS OF LAW 
 
The rise of the “society of networks”,153 a kind of a tertiary remodelling of the “society of the 
individuals” is the next step within the evolution of administration: it is characterised in the 
cognitivist approach developed here by the reaction to a further rise in complexity of the 
knowledge base of society. This evolution is due to the fact that the structuring capabilities of 
the second order model of modern society is changed by the rise of a new mode of production 
and organisation (supported by the importance of information as the principal resource of 
production). The change to flat hierarchies154
                                                 
149 See for a conception of the cases of the U.S. Supreme Court as “nodes” within a network of interrelationships 
Timothy R. Johnson et al., Network Analysis and the Law: Measuring the Legal Importance of Supreme court 
Precedents, 15 POLICY ANALYSIS 324 (2007); in a similar vein David G. Post & Michael B. Eisen, How Long is the 
Coast Line of the Law?. Thoughts on the Fractal Nature of Legal Systems, 29 JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 584 
(2000). 
 and heterarchical self-organisation which process 
information in a new mode generates a third layer of the organisation of postmodern society. 
Technological knowledge, in particular, is no longer concentrated in stable expert communities, 
but is distributed in overlapping project-oriented “epistemic communities” which combine 
general and specific knowledge production in hybrid forms of communication; the primary 
examples are biotechnology, and computer technology both as a basis of production of new 
150 See for a reference to the network (and related conceptions) Thomas A. Smith, The Web of Law, San Diego 
Legal Studies research Paper 06-11. 
151 See Philip E. Tetlock, EXPERT POLITICAL JUDGMENT: HOW GOOD IS IT? HOW CAN WE KNOW? 216 (2005). 
152 This does of course not exclude a more dominant role of the judiciary which tends to second guess the 
rationality of administrative decision-making, Martin S. Shapiro, Juridicalization of Politics in the US, 15 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 101, 107 (1994) (for the “litigation-oriented style of rulemaking”).  
153 See for a general theory Manuel Castells, THE RISE OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY: THE INFORMATION AGE. 
ECONOMY, SOCIETY AND CULTURE, Vol. 1, 2nd ed. (2000). 
154 Nico Krisch, The Pluralism of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 247 
(2006); Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law to Globalization and Law, 43 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF 
TRANSNATIONAL LAW 485 (2005). 
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information programmes and as an organisational resource in other fields of production.155 
More and more hybrid modes of organisation which blend forms of the market and 
organisational closure (“network contracts”)156 spread in society, and have a repercussion on 
the procedures of administrative decision-making which transcend traditional borders and 
stable separations. This transformation is driven by a disruptive change of information 
technology and the ensuing modes of communication157 that easily transcend the hitherto 
established borderlines between organisations, organisational departments and allow, for 
example, for hybrid forms of co-operation between people who remain, in one respect, strong 
competitors.158
 
 
The rise of the concept of “governance”159 as a reflection of the transformation of the 
established “control projects”160 is referred to in both the private and the public sector. For 
administration, this is equivalent to an even more intense involvement in knowledge 
generation processes,161 on the one hand, and the decrease of the privileged role of the “acte 
administratif” (“Verwaltungsakt”) as the “signifier162 for the processing of the inter-
relationships which allow for the weaving of knowledge-generating and knowledge-stabilising 
networks of decisions163
                                                 
155 Michel Gensollen, Economie non rivale et communautés d’information, RÉSEAUX 141 No. 124 (2004),; id., Biens 
informationnels et communautés médiatisées, 113 REVUE D’ECONOMIE POLITIQUE, Special number, 8 (2003); see 
also Ladeur, supra, note 146. 
 which bind uncertainty and allow for the linkage with private 
156 Gunther Teubner, NETZWERK ALS VERTRAGSVERBUND. VIRTUELLE UNTERNEHMEN, FRANCHISING, JUST-IN-
TIME IN SOZIALWISSENSCHAFTLICHER UND JURISTISCHER HINSICHT (2004). 
157 Dirk Baecker, Systems, Network, and Culture, 15 SOZIALE SYSTEME 271, 272 (2009). 
158 For the trend toward network like organizations see Paul J. DiMaggio, Introduction: Making Sense of the 
Contemporaray Firm and Prefiguring its Future, 3, 5, 19, in: The TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY FIRM: CHANGING 
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPEKTIVE (id., ed., 2001).  
159 For the use of the concept of “governance” for a theory of administrative law in particular see Orly Lobel, The 
Renew Deal, 89 MINNESSOTA LAW REVIEW 263 (2004); for political science see Renate Mayntz, Governance 
Theory als fortentwickelte Steuerungstheorie, 11, in: GOVERNANCE-FORSCHUNG, (Gunnar Folke Schuppert, ed., 
2005); Hans-Heinrich Trute, Wolfgang Denkhaus, Doris Kühlers, Governance in der Verwaltungsrechtswissenschaft 
37 DIE VERWALTUNG 451, 456 (2004); for the change from regulation and public “steering” of market processes to 
the design of complex processes of public-private coordination; see also the contributions in: GOVERNMENT BY 
CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009) and Karl-
Heinz Ladeur, Keyword: International Governance, Theory of, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, to appear 2011. 
160 Harrison C. White, IDENTITY AND CONTROL. HOW SOCIAL FORMATIONS EMERGE, 2nd. ed., 220 et seq. (2008); id., 
Networks and Meaning: Styles and Switches, 13 SOZIALE SYSTEME 543 (2007); Dirk Baecker, 
WIRTSCHAFTSSOZIOLOGIE 128 (2006). 
161 This is why the explanation of the rise of the concept of “governance” as a repercussion of the subsumption of 
the state under the logic of the firm seems to be to simplistic, see Myriam Revault d’Allonnes, POURQUOI NOS 
N’AIMONS PAS LA DÉMOCRATIE 125 (2010).  
162 Yair Neuman, On Love, Hate and Knowledge, 90 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 697 (2009). 
163 See in a theoretical perspective on the paradigmatic structuring of intrapersonal networks of self-regulation, 
Neuman, ibid., 702. 
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transactions. The relationship with private actors takes on an increasingly project-based 
orientation because it is the private sector which controls the knowledge processes in project-
related networks as well. “Project”, in this sense, is not equivalent to a goal-oriented process – 
on the contrary, it refers more to a complex “mapping” of different co-operative ventures 
which are supposed to generate a domain of action first from which specific actions and 
strategies might emerge in an evolutionary way.164 Administrative networks of co-operation165 
have to be set up both within the public sphere for the knowledge accumulation and outside it, 
i.e., via inter-relationships with networks of private actors.166 This is true for the support of 
technology (telecoms, high-tech) and also for the management of whatever risks which emerge 
from production processes which are set up beyond the realm of the traditional experience-
based knowledge production. It should be epitomised that the basic “change agents” which 
produce a new deep process of self-transformation within the legal system and its 
infrastructure of social norms167
                                                 
164 For a theoretical perspective see Patrick Schumacher, Les mécanismes de l’innovation radicale, 85 
COMMUNICATIONS No. 85, 171, 180 (2009). 
 and practices have a cognitive nature: i.e., the knowledge used 
in production processes and their management underlie a disruptive change, and shatter the 
paradigm of co-ordination among the different layers of the rule system of society. The rapid 
transfer of knowledge enabled by information technology undermines the conceptual, 
organisational, legal and practical separations upon which the legal system is based, such as the 
institutional separation of the market (exchange processes) and organisation (which keep 
production and management processes partially insulated from markets). The use of 
sophisticated information technology allows for the establishment of hybrid co-ordination 
processes which show characteristics of both hitherto separated forms of order: for example, 
complex contracts on the co-ordination of firms and their suppliers make a close integration of 
production processes possible without a formal integration. This is one of the phenomena of a 
new network-like forms of generating order between stable organisational hierarchy and 
heterarchical “loose” co-ordination via the market and contracts. A further element is to be 
seen in the closer connection between technology and science in the development of high-tech 
products and procedures: the established stable mode of co-ordination between general 
science and specific product development undergoes a transformation which leads to a much 
165 See for the transnational level Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental 
Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2002).  
166 For the characteristic element of transnational cooperation among “like” administrative agencies see ead. & 
David Zaring, Networking Goes International: An Update, 2 ANNUAL REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL SCIENCE 211, 215, 
223 (2006).  
167 See also Eric A. Posner, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 4 (2000) who points out that law operates alwa against a “ 
background stream of nonlegal regulation” – however, game theory may be to thin to do justice to the productivity 
of social normativity.  
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closer reciprocal interrelationship between science and technology in both directions:168 i.e., on 
the one hand, joint-ventures on research of private firms react to the rapid transfer of scientific 
knowledge to product development (biotechnology). At the other extreme of the range of 
possibilities, one can observe even technological processes (Nano-technology) where there is 
no separation between these hitherto separated modes of knowledge and technological 
interventions into nature or the structure of materials creates new realities which lie beyond 
the abstract scientific observation of an outside reality. This need not be deepened here.169 At 
the middle range of technological evolution, the transformation of the network industries, in 
particular, have to be mentioned: the monopolistic hierarchical development of 
telecommunications services that followed a stable trajectory of technological improvement of 
“big networks”170 has been changed to a complex heterarchical opaque search process under 
extreme uncertainty.171 This development has had considerable repercussions in the 
transformation of the legal structure of regulation: the state no longer claims to occupy a 
privileged observing position, instead, its position has been shifted to the periphery of a 
heterarchical network whose development can only be anticipated in a scenario-like mode.172
 
 
G. THE CHANGING “SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY” OF THE LAW AND THE FRAGMENTATION OF SOCIETY 
 
The strategic “design” of such loosely-coupled networks is only imaginable as a co-operative 
venture in which the private actors have a stake themselves, because it pre-supposes the joint 
constructive contributions of more actors and information brokers,173 and includes the 
necessity to set up a self-reflexive component of a knowledge management: knowledge is not a 
neutral resource that can be conceived without paying attention to “social epistemology” as 
should have been made plausible by the examples of the knowledge basis of the “society of the 
individuals” and the “society of organisations”.174
                                                 
168 This is the case for nanotechnology Jean-Pierre Dupuy & Alexei Grinbaum, Living with Uncertainty: Toward the 
Ongoing Normative Assessment of Nanotechnology, in: NANOTECHNOLOGY CHALLENGES: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
PHILOSOPHY, ETHICS AND SOCIETY 287 (Joachim Schummer & Davis Baird, eds., 2006). 
 This reflection should have shown that the 
form of networks that is - with good reasons - invoked when it comes to the description of 
169 See for the emergence of a conception of objectivity in natural science Lorraine Daston & Peter Galiston, 
OBJECTIVITY (2007). 
170 Thomas P. Hughes, NETWORKS OF POWER: THE ELECTRIFICATION OF WESTERN SOCITIES 1880 – 1930 (1993).  
171 See in a theoretical perspective Herbert A. Simon, The Architecture of Complexity, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY Vol.1006, 467 (1962). 
172 Robert Baldwin & Martin Cave, UNDERSTANDING REGULATION: THEORY, STRATEGY, AND PRACTICE, 31 (1999); 
see also Gunther Teubner, After Legal Instrumentalism? Strategic Models of Post-Regulatory Law, 299, in: 
DILEMMAS OF LAW IN THE WELFARE STATE (id., ed. 1986). 
173 Michael Stohl & Cynthia Stohl, Human Rights, Nation States, and NGOs: Structural Holes and the Emergence of 
Global Regimes, 442, 72 COMMUNICATION MONOGRAPHS No. 4 (2005). 
174 Eileen M. Milner, MANAGING INFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR, 65, 164 et seq. (2000). 
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administrative processes beyond the frames of territoriality175 is primarily a phenomenon 
which emerges from within the societal transformation of the nation states themselves. Global 
administrative law is not the product of the challenge of the state-based legal structure from 
outside, it is, instead, to be described as the outcome of a general shift from the paradigmatic 
forms of the “society of organisations” to the “society of networks”, which has a disruptive 
effect on the legal structure which found a new stability in the 1970s and 1980s of the 20th 
century after a long period of experimentation. The emergence of the fragmented network 
form is due to a new evolutionary transformation of the knowledge- and rule-base of society in 
the broad sense sketched in this article.176
 
 
The rise of the concept of the network177 is a consequence of the fact that it is no longer a 
stable separation between the general experience as a distributed knowledge base, on the one 
hand, and the “best available” knowledge178 produced by big firms, on the other hand, which 
characterise the focal structure of the cognitive “pool of variety” but a much more 
heterarchically fragmented loosely-coupled cognitive network which is at stake in 
postmodernity.179 This new structure allows at the same time for more intense co-ordination 
among private actors themselves and between public and private actors in a way that blurs the 
hitherto-established separations that had already – if only to a limited extent – been severed by 
the institutions of the “society of the organisations”.180 The flexibility draws on the fact that the 
phenomenon of the “joint venture” established by firms which still compete with each other on 
the market demonstrates the potential of co-operation in new project based “epistemic 
communities”.181
                                                 
175 For the fundamental transformation and flexibilisation of „space” see Saskia Sassen, TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, 
RIGHTS. FROM MEDIEVAL TO GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES (2008); for the reconstruction of “space” as an outcome of 
complex formal and informal networks (as opposed to clear separation of “levels”) see Kevin R. Cox, Spaces of 
Dependence, Spaces of Engagement and the Politics of Scale, 17 POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY 1 (1998).  
 This is valid both for the private and the public domain. In the realm of the 
176 This transformation finds its repercussion in the rise of multiperspectivism in philosophy, in particular in Jacques 
Derrida, see Rodolphe Gasché, INVENTIONS OF DIFFFERENCE: ON JACQUES DERRIDA, 10, 61 et seq. (1994). 
177 See also Albert-László Barabási,LINKED. HOW EVERYTHING IS CONNECTED TO EVERYTHING ELSE AND WHAT IT 
MEANS FOR BUSINESS, SCIENCE AND EVERYDAY LIFE (2003); Veronika Tacke, Differenzierung und/oder 
Vernetzung? Über Spannungen, Annäherungspotentiale und systemtheoretische Fortsetzungsmöglichkeiten der 
Netzwerkdiskussion, 15 SOZIALE SYSTEME 243, 254 (2009). 
178 For the use of knowledge in economy still fundamental Friedrich August von Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in 
Society, 35 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 519 (1945). 
179 For a „cognitivistic” approach to the regulation of global financial markets in particular See the contributions in: 
TOWARDS A COGNITIVE METHOD IN GLOBAL FINANCE. THE GOVERNANCE OF KNOWLEDGE-BASED FINANCIAL 
SYSTEM (Torsten Strulik & Helmut Willke, eds., 2006); Torsten Strulik & Matthias Kussin, Finanzmarktregulierung 
und Wissenspolitik. Basel II – Die aufsichtsrechtliche Konstitution kollektiver Intelligenz, 26 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 101 (2005). 
180 Renate Mayntz, Modernization and the Logic of Interorganizational Design, 1 KNOWLEDGE & POLICY 3 (1993). 
181 Gensollen, supra, note 155. 
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latter, the state is able to co-ordinate its strategies with groups of firms in research processes 
which are no longer “steered”182
 
 by stable technological trajectories and expectations. 
Something similar goes, for example, for the co-ordination among transnational firms upon the 
basis of the new Lex Mercatoria which is self-organised by private operators; however, one 
should bear in mind that, in general, rather big enterprises are parties like a “club”,183 to its 
processing while conflicts among smaller firms are still judged by state courts with reference to 
a generalised set of norms which have their origin in the realm of public transactions.184
 
 
One has to admit that the cohesion of the new transnational law is (and can be) - to a much 
lesser extent - stabilised by public institutions; institutions (legal norms in particular): it is more 
driven by a network of dispersed strategic operations of big law firms (for transnational clients). 
This is not so much a non-democratic illegitimate form of law-making but, due to the advent of 
a new structural “drift” in the legal system, a phenomenon that is not new if we look back to 
the emergence of preceding legal paradigms.185
 
 
Looking back on the internal self-transformation of the state-based legal system, one can - with 
good reason - ask whether the ensuing fragmentation of the cognitive basis of the postmodern 
society and its impact on the fragmented legal system does not challenge the role of the public 
at large and its participation in legal rule-making.186 However, one has to be aware of the fact 
that, even in the liberal “society of the individuals”, the central frame of reference for the 
generation of a collective order has been the spontaneously processed realm of experience and 
its societal rules, upon which the formal legal system was super-imposed as the second layer of 
the normative system of society. The legislator had only played a minor rule in this system as 
has been shown above. Even in the “society of organisations” during its heydays in the 1970s, 
the democratic “steering” potential of the state187
                                                 
182 See for the paradigm of “steering” private action through administrative law see Kersten & Lenski, supra, at 9, 
530 et seq.; Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, Eigenständigkeit der Verwaltung, in: GRUNDLAGEN DES 
VERWALTUNGSRECHTS, Vol. 1, § 10 No. 13 (Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann & Andreas Voßkuhle, eds., 2006). 
 could not primarily make use of legislation, 
but, in the so-called “golden age”, the nation state had to draw on the pre-structuring of society 
by the corporatist co-operation of the pluralistic social groups and the big firms and the 
183 Esty, supra, note125, 1490; see also Alec Stone Sweet, The New Lex Mercatoria and Transnational Governance, 
13 JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 627 (2006). 
184 Monica Kilian, CISG and the Problem with Common Law Jurisdiction, 10 JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW & 
POLICY 217, 226 (2001); Ingeborg Schwenzer & Pascal Hachem, The CISG – Success and Pitfalls, 57 AMERICAN 
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW 457 (2009). 
185 See Sigrid Quack, Legal Professionals and Transnational Law-Making: A Case of Distributed Agency 14 
ORGANIZATION 643, 644 (2007). 
186 For the legitimation function of participatory processes in decision making procedures see Esty, supra, note 125, 
1489. 
187 For this paradigm see David Y. Livshiz, Updating American Administrative Law: WTO, International Standards?, 
Domestic Implementation and Public Participation, 24 WISCONSON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL LAW 961 
(2007). 
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“representative organisations” of both.188 This complex group-based infrastructure of the late 
modern nation state has left its traces in the legal system, which was composed of both an 
increasing number of laws and the regulation of more and more spheres of societal domains in 
the welfare state. However, a closer look at the norms themselves make it clear that their 
conception pre-supposed a moderating role of administration and in the legal system in the 
proper sense a new methodology that opened itself toward the “normalising” impact of the 
differentiated social spheres by reference to broad concepts which built a bridge between the 
pre-structured reality and the law. A prominent example for this new methodology is the rise 
“balancing”, and the “proportionality principle”:189 both are fact ridden, in the same way as the 
understanding of the major concepts of liberal law had drawn on general experience and social 
norms190 as the frame of reference for the legal practice. The state-based conception of the 
democratic statute191
                                                 
188 See Colin Crouch, CAPITALIST DIVERSITY AND CHANGE: RECOMBINANT GOVERNANCE AND INSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE 32, 92, 101 (2005). 
 as the core of the legal system has always been normativistic wishful-
189 See the overview in Tor-Inge Harbo, The Function of the Proportionality Principle in European Law, 16 
EUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL 158 (2010); the “proportionality principle” can in my view not be interpreted as a 
judicial strategy to gain dominance over policy making or even the reform of constitution, as Alec Stone Sweet & 
Jud Matthews, Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism, 47 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF 
TRANSNATIONAL LAW 68 (2008), argue; this would be a much too broad assumption because this approach is 
often also chosen where courts could well follow more classical doctrinal strategies of argumentation (e. g. the 
judgments of the German Federal Constitutional Court on the constitutional limits of the freedom of expression or 
other constitutional liberties); even a rather politically active court such as this court is far from “dominating” 
policy making, it strengthens sometimes interests that are neglected by the consensus oriented political process 
but does not call its basis into question; reference to the proportionality principle is rather an expression of the 
increasing internal tensions within the postmodern legal order (Karl-Heinz Ladeur, KRITIK DER ABWÄGUNG IN DER 
GRUNDRECHTSDOGMATIK (2004) and its overcomplexity due to the openness to any interest and its lack of “meta-
rules of collision”; see Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal 
Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1999 (2004); Robert 
Wai, Transnational Private Law and Private Ordering in a Contested Global Society, 46 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL 
LAW JOURNAL 471 (2005); and from a more pragmatic point of view Michelle Everson & Christian Joerges, 
Reconceptualising Europeanisation as a Public Law of Collisions: Comitology, Agencies and an Interactive Public 
Adjudication, 512, in: Administrative Governance (Herwig C. Hofmann & Alexander H. Türck ,eds., 2006). This 
means does not have a stable orientation as was the case in the liberal society of the individuals; Lucien Jaume, LA 
LIBERTE ET LA LOI 259, 304 (2000). The growing importance of constitutional control of the law and decision 
making processes in more and more countries is one of the many symptoms of the fragmentation of the legal 
system and its “entangled” hierarchies but not a consequence of a shift of law making power to courts. Hirschl , 
supra, note 135, 214, points out with good reasons that high courts only rarely call into question the established 
political power.  
190 The focus on “social agents” as the main source of legal norms (and not the state as such) goes back to Philip 
Selznick, Philippe Nonet & Howard M. Vollmer, LAW, SOCIETY AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE, 1969, 244.  
191 In the US “democratic” legitimacy of administrative action historically was based more on the authority of the 
president than democratic statutes, see Jerry L. Mashaw, Administration and ‘The Democracy’: Administrative Law 
from Jackson to Lincoln 1829-1861, 117 YALE LAW JOURNAL1568 (2008). 
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thinking.192 In this respect, no fundamental change has occurred in the postmodern society of 
the networks. This common limitation of legislation by its dependence on the “framing” effects 
of societal norms notwithstanding, the challenge to the legal system and its difficulties in 
finding a consistent response is undeniable. The question has to be re-formulated, though, in 
the sense of a search for a new role of the legal system in the stricter sense and a re-
formulation for the inter-relationships with the fragmented heterarchical type of loosely-
coupled norms generated from segmented functionally-specified networks,193 instead of rather 
stable group-based and organisation-based links between the law and the societal knowledge 
base. Both the law of the society of the individuals and the pluralistic law of the society of 
(representative) organisations194
 
 were characterised by broad comprehensive cognitive “pools 
of variety” which corresponded to the territorial logic of the nation state, whereas the 
fragmented functionally-ordered segmented cognitive network of postmodernity lacks this 
focal orientation, which implies a potential transparency, of mutual interference and co-
ordination by common meta-rules and methods of argumentation and comparison. 
The common reference to the proportionality principle both in domestic and European law is 
problematical: because of its vagueness, it tends to block the adequate conceptualisation of 
new challenges related to the heterogeneity of postmodern law and its concomitant “norm 
collisions”.195
 
 It is only acceptable as a kind of “placeholder” for a new type of an emergent 
norm that is generated in an experimental mode ex post from the observation of new conflicts 
which cannot be solved with reference to traditional norms that are set ex ante and are 
“applied” to cases. This new type of norm which is generated “bottom up” is due to the high 
level of complexity of postmodern law. 
The network like structure of the postmodern cognitive infrastructure is much less transparent 
and not easy to integrate into a comprehensive framework. This has an impact also on the self-
understanding of citizenship which is not obviously compatible with the loose network of 
knowledge distributed not over society at large, but over differentiated webs which are not 
easily accessible to individuals,196 which take on a fragmented and self-designed character 
themselves.197
                                                 
192 The authority of public institutions is derived from a complex “overarching governance structure” and not 
legislation alone, see Esty, supra, note125. 
 
193 Niklas Luhmann, Die Paradoxien des Entscheidens, 17, 43, in: PARADOXIEN DER ENTSCHEIDUNG: 
WAHL/SELEKTION IN KUNST, LITERATUR UND MEDIEN (Friedrich Balke, & Urs Stäheli, eds., 2003). 
194 Crouch, supra, note 184, p. 32. 
195 Joerges & Everson, supra, note 189; from the point of view of administrative law see Karl-Heinz Ladeur, The 
Significance of General Administrative Law for European Administrative Law, 167, in: Rainer Nickel (ed.), CONFLICT 
OF LAWS AND LAWS OF CONFLICT IN EUROPE AND BEYOND (Rainer Nickel, ed, 2010). 
196 Peter Fuchs, MODERNE KOMMUNIKATION 67 (1993). 
197 Ladeur, supra, note 128. 
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IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND COURTS 
 
A. THE CO-OPERATIVE CONSTRUCTION OF A NORM 
 
The focus on legitimacy and the simplistic supposition of a deductive rationality of the legal 
process detracts the attention from the problems of “internal autopoiesis” of law, i.e., the 
requirements of maintaining the closure of the system at the micro-scale, which Luhmann 
seems to neglect as well.198 The legal system can be regarded as being composed of chains of 
decisions being produced by the tribunals – this is what Luhmann calls the “centre” of the legal 
system, whereas the processing of contracts and other private transactions is to be located at 
the periphery.199 In my view, this rather static internal differentiation does not give sufficient 
tribute to the internal “unrest” which is continuously moving the system and which prevents its 
acentric processing from coming to a halt.200 The same is true for the conception of the legal 
system as composed of norms and their “application” to a case. Systems theory’s focus on 
decisions and transactions comes closer to a more productive view of the internal aspect of the 
self-construction of the legal system. The legal system not only has to reproduce its border lines 
in order to close its rationality off from the direct interference of other systems (religion, 
politics) but it also has to reproduce its unity both by the flow of “legal components” (decisions, 
contracts, etc.) and by the reflection and control of the internal rationality of the inter-
relationships between operations: the process of decision-making or contracting cannot always 
start from zero, its internal experimentation has to weave connections between operations and 
to observe which patterns prove to be successful and which have to be “second guessed” in 
new trial and error processes. The functional requirement to stabilise expectations under 
conditions of uncertainty201 pre-supposes not only autonomy vis-à-vis the other social systems, 
but also the internal management of rules. Rules have a paradoxical character in as much as 
they cannot just preserve the “given” (in this case, one does not need rules in the modern 
sense), they have to allow for orientation in a society which is continuously involved in 
processes of self-transformation202
                                                 
198 This seems true in spite of the fact that Luhmann takes into consideration that law is dependent on cases and is 
in search of a kind of “’local’ rationality” alone, Niklas Luhmann, supra, note 40, 352.. 
 that includes the subject himself or herself, who “fulfils the 
mysterious function of association lived experience of the individual with a communicable and 
199 Luhmann, ibid., 293 et seq., 304. 
200 See in a theoretical perspective on the discontinuity within the search processes of self-organization Henri 
Atlan, L’émergence du nouveau et du sens, 115, 122, in: L’AUTO-ORGANISATION. DE LA PYSIQUE AU POLITIQUE 
(PAUL DUMOUCHEL & JEAN-PIERRE DUPUY, 1983): “random perturbations” may be self-reinforced and provoke 
the emergence of a new paradigm of “order from noise”. 
201 Luhmann, ibid., 263 et seq. 
202 This is why a the “paradoxical co-existence of legal and non-legal” has to be presupposed, Peer Zumbansen, 
Transnational Legal Pluralism, 1 TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY 141, 159 (2010). 
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social form of expression”.203 The rule has to be continuously re-worked and re-modelled204 by 
both new judgments and new operations as well as the generation of new patterns of public 
and private decision-making205 in order to be able to allow for co-ordination among individuals 
or other legal persons who have to struggle with the dynamics of self-transformation of society. 
This is why precedents (decisions) or patterns of contracting and a certain stability of 
expression guaranteed by referring to patterns of behaviour have to be reproduced by the legal 
system. The paradox of the decision is expressed quite convincingly by Russell Hardin, who 
takes the view that, in common law – not only there – the individual court decision is meant to 
produce a new rule for third persons, while the present litigants are simultaneously treated as 
though the rule had been in place when they acted”.206 This includes the “docility” of the legal 
actors who have to adapt themselves to both factual and legal standards of behaviour.207 
Against the background of these general assumptions, the concept of “network” may be helpful 
for the conceptualisation of the internal rationality of the legal system: this concept pre-
supposes a complex infrastructure of the legal system and its internal inter-relationships which 
are managed and re-arranged by different forms of feedback loops.208 The feedback loops re-
inforce the connections between a cluster of operations which aggregate a “hub” and 
reproduce the closure of patterns of behaviour or a second order reflexive concept based upon 
the observation and justification of a pattern. At the same time, the network of patterned 
operations reproduces differentiation i. e., the separation between a pattern and a set of 
“exceptions” which are loosely-coupled with the pattern as a default mechanism which exerts a 
certain attraction on the acceptability of a certain construction, interpretation or 
argumentation in a legal process:209
                                                 
203 Neuman, supra, note 162, 705. 
 for example, the freedom of a contract can, of course, 
always be called into question because “freedom” is a vague concept, but, in a traditional legal 
understanding, the possibility of bringing in this argument is kept separate from the pattern of 
normal contracting and restricted to invocation of mental illness, error, breach of boni mores, 
etc. This is not necessarily the case: the “hub which reproduces the pattern of a normal 
contract can be re-opened and the “structural hole”, as network analysis might put the 
relationship between the stabilised “hub” and the weaker node of exceptional operations 
204 See Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate Subject of 
Study, 7 LAW AND SOCIETY JOURNAL 719 (1973), who rightly underlines that the law is not an “entity capable of 
controlling that (social – KHL) context”. 
205 Kathleen Noonan, Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Legal Accountability in the Service-Based Welfare State: 
Lessons from Child Welfare Reform, 34 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 523, 524 (2006). 
206 Russell Hardin, INDETERMINACY AND SOCIETY 33, 47 (2003). 
207 For a theoretical perspective on the transsubjective character of procedures of standardisation as normalisation 
in the Foucauldian vein see Stéphane Legrand, LES NORMES CHEZ FOUCAULT, 2, 154 (2007); Macherey, supra, 
note 51, 81 et seq.; Albert Ogien, Du sens commun comme une sorte de faculté de juger, 445, in: NORMATIVITES 
DU SENS COMMUN (Claude Gauthier & Sandra Laugier, eds., 2009.  
208 The transnational networks find their repercussion in the internal fragmentation of the nation state: Kenichi 
Ohmae, THE END OF THE NATION STATE: THE RISE OF REGIONAL ECONOMIES (1995). 
209 Lefebvre, supra, note 79, 59. 
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which are kept separate in a smaller “hub”, can be overcome by introducing new types of 
“weak” individuals for whom the pattern is modified (consumers, dependent workers and 
employees, etc). A new mode of overcoming this structural hole in private law is the reference 
to the constitution, i.e., an analogy is drawn between a private law operation and the 
infringement of a constitutional right by the state.210
 
 This re-opens the internal closure which 
was established in the past and demands new forms of closure which limit this inter-
relationship in order to allow for stability within. The example shows that a completely 
patternless openness of the legal system to arguments would block the internal autopoiesis 
even if the outer autopoiesis was not at stake, because it could just be an orientation crisis of 
the legal system and not a case of interference of a different social system. 
The past and present status of administrative law is not a creation of judges. Law in the 
administrative system is to be understood primarily as a self-generated set of rules by 
administrative deciders, which is controlled or shaped by the legislator or judges only after the 
fact.211 Judicial review can only be “sporadic and peripheral”.212 A different picture would lead 
to “institutional blindness”213 and ignorance of the creative and experimental function of 
administrators themselves and of the “wider conception of administrative justice” that includes 
the impact of the eigenrationality of administrative practices.214 It would also overtax the unity 
of administrative law.215
 
 
It is not by chance that, in Germany, the general rules of administrative procedure have only 
been codified in 1976.216
                                                 
210 See the comparative contributions in: EUROPEAN AND US CONSTITUTIONALISM (Georg Nolte, ed., 2005).  
 The above-mentioned complex processes enacted by the 
administration of the “society of organisations” have also been tackled at first by the 
administrative agencies themselves and have only been the object of vague laws which draw on 
the experience of administrators later on. Administrative law emerges from the 
indetermination of a process which draws on the decision as that which creates new 
experimental “bindingness” from situation to situation - in a society which is no longer based 
211 Thomas Poole, The Reformation of English Administrative Law, 68 CAMBRIDGE LAW JOURNAL 142, 155 (2009) 
156; Jerry L. Mashaw, Between Facts and Norms: Agency Statutory Interpretation as an Autonomous Enterprise, 55 
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAW REVIEW 497, 520 (2005); id. supra, note 7, at 1378. 
212 Poole, ibid. 157. 
213 See generally Adrian Vermeule, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL 
INTERPRETATION (2006). 
214 Poole, ibid., 164, 167. 
215 Poole, ibid., 165. 
216 This is very similar to the evolution of American administrative law: the APA has mainly codified administrative 
practices, see Mashaw, supra, note 7;; for the political constellation that made possible the APA as a reaction to 
the New Deal see McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, supra , note 146.. 
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upon the illusion of being able to reproduce a tradition - and not as deduced from a stable 
norm.217
 
 
This development, which was very similar in other countries such as France, UK, USA, is 
summarised by B. Kingsbury218 in the assumption that judges have, over time, been able to 
construct a system of administrative law without comprehensive specification in statutes or 
constitutional norms. The second part of this observation concerning the reduced involvement 
of the legislators is certainly correct. With the first part concerning judges, one might have 
difficulties, at least, as far as the “construction” of a system of administrative law is concerned. 
The main instrument of administrative law in France and Germany, the “administrative act”, 
has long been regarded as a remnant of the absolutist state. However, as was remarked earlier, 
this is a one-sided observation: this institution has been completely remodelled and been 
adapted to the conditions of the liberal state and society: it allows for objectivation, self- 
continuation, learning and transparency.219 However, it remains a construction of 
administration; it has been recognised, structured and formalised by the judiciary. To call this 
“judge-made law”220
 
 is somewhat superficial, because it is more a product of a coupling 
between the networks of administration and the processing of a network of the judges which 
introduced stability (for the rights of individuals in particular) and specific rules for validity etc., 
into the administration law, although a major part of the rules relate to practices which have 
been generated by the administration itself. This true, in particular, for the broad range of 
administrative operations which are mainly self-referential, in the sense that the direct contact 
to the rights of the citizens is reduced or regarded as non-existent. In Germany, this is the world 
of the “special power relationships” (“besonderes Gewaltverhältnis”) dominating public schools, 
military service, the status of civil servants and “public assistance”, which implied a specific 
dynamic status allowing for administrative “creation”, as opposed to public services provided 
by the state (such as the telephone, water, electricity, etc.) or local agencies, which could be 
the object of a special public law regime but did not impose a status of continuous regulation. 
The claim to preserve a continuity of public order by administrative decision-making 
(administrative acts in particular) involved a leeway of discretion because rights were regarded 
from the outset as being inherently limited by the rights of others and the comprehensive 
“general interest”.221
                                                 
217 For a theoretical perspective on “indetermination” as the rule to which “perfect knowledge” is only the 
exception see Albert Ogien, LES RÈGLES DE LA PRATIQUE SOCIOLOGIQUE 109 (2007); Christiane Chauviré, PEIRCE 
ET LA SIGNIFICATION. INTRODUCTION À UNE LOGIQUE DU VAGUE (2007), both draw on Charles S. Peirce.  
 Notwithstanding this, this general interest was no longer that of the state, 
218 Kingsbury, supra, note 9. 
219 For a critique see Mashaw, supra, note 9, 1378. 
220 See in a theoretical perspective Kerchove & Ost, supra, note 14. 
221 See Bohlender, supra, note 49, for the evolution of the concept of “Gemeinwohl” (“common interest”) in 
Germany. 
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but of the “order” of society at large, which included - as mentioned before - continuous 
change.222
 
 
This phenomenon does not differ much from the relationship between private law in a stricter 
sense and the practical networks of experience which process the cognitive infrastructure of 
the law. 
 
This is what is at stake when N. Luhmann223 regards “decisions” as the operation which is 
characteristic for the autopoietic process of reproduction of the legal system. One should go 
one step further and expand more on the idea of network as the infrastructure of the legal 
system. Luhmann himself also refers to the idea of network, but does not give much detail on 
what he means when referring to the phenomena of “networks” in the legal system.224 The 
shift from the hierarchical perspective on the legal norm as the steering element of the process 
of setting up the internal autopoietic structure of the legal system, to a heterarchical 
conception of the development based upon a processing of decisions not just from case-to-case 
but as a kind of management of inter-relationships and connection possibilities within a 
network of decisions,225 contracts and, above all, judgments might be more adequate as the 
reference to norms or “principles” as the “open source” of the legal system. Legal principles 
should not be regarded as being based upon the “nature of things” (G. Del Vecchio) or an 
abstract set of meta-rules for the generation and completion of norms, or their adaptation to 
specific cases. Instead, they are to be conceptualised as reflexive general experiences drawn 
from a vast amount of cases 226 and linked to practices of legal decision-making. They have a 
distributed character themselves, in as much as they are processed within the networks as 
recurring patterns of the management of the inter-relationships and constraints which have 
been accumulated in the legal system.227
                                                 
222 Powell, supra, note 73. 
 The autonomy of the legal system is not equivalent to 
being insulated from moral values, politics, economic interests, etc. Its autopoiesis consists, 
instead, in sustaining an impersonal “network of networks” of inter-relationships which 
generate patterns of operations, institutional constraints and beliefs (including the possibility of 
forming expectations and longer chains of actions) so as to make learning as a means of coping 
with uncertainty both possible and attractive. The autonomy of the legal system is a response 
223 Luhmann, supra, note 198, 46, 78, 98, and passim. 
224 Luhamnn, supra, note 193, 17, 43.; id., DIE GESELLSCHAFT DER GESELLSCHAFT, 65, 851 (1997), refers to the 
“networked” (“netzwerkförmig”) interrelationships between communications and the generation of new 
opportunities for communication within systems; see also Tacke, supra, note 177. 
225 Luhmann, ibid., 17, 43.  
226 Luhmann, supra, note 198, 438. 
227 North et al., supra, note 60, 261. 
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to the “essential incompleteness” (“inachèvement essentiel”228) of both individuals and society, 
which makes institutions the “engines of history” which retain a productive “pool of variety” of 
operations that shape change by imposing constraints,229 and allow for an impersonal 
monitoring upon the basis of a systemic memory. This distributed memory which is processed 
by the complex “network of networks” of cases and the internal rules on the reflection of inter-
relationships between cases and decisions allows for the “invention” of that which is not given 
a priori230 and generates new structured “regular” action potentials which, at the same time, 
open a perspective for co-operation, co-ordination, and repetition. Order cannot be generated 
from a privileged rational totalising view on society from “outside”; in a civil society, it is the 
emergent property of individual and organised productive operations with and within chaos,231
 
 
which is retained and structured by an institutionalised memory beyond the individual. 
B. THE NEW ROLE OF JUDICIAL CONTROL IN POSTMODERN SOCIETIES 
 
As has been shown in this article, the breaks of symmetry in the technological system which 
challenge the network structure within the legal system are not managed by the legislator first, 
and are then broken down to a new practice of decision-making in the legal system. On the 
contrary, the constant flux of operations in the networks within the legal system and the 
exchange processes with the knowledge-producing networks outside are themselves the 
“agents of change”.232
 
 Apparently, the recent evolutionary transformations of administrative 
law are not well-reflected in legal theory, which tries to meet the challenge of complexity by 
new holistic approaches which abandon conceptual and doctrinal analysis of the change 
process. 
German administrative law has been superseded in the last decades by a tendency to establish 
a monistic approach focused on rights233 and the proportionality principle.234 Interestingly, the 
same has been said recently about English administrative law, after the introduction of the 
European human rights into the English legal system.235
                                                 
228 Gauthier, supra, note 80, 242. 
 This is a reductionist perspective that 
229 North et al. , supra, note 60, 261; Greif, supra, note 98, 380. 
230 Gauthier, supra, note 80, 242. 
231 Gauthier, supra, note 80, 233. 
232 See also the approach developed by Mashaw, supra, note 7, 1413, who also concentrates on practices of 
administrative agencies and not primarily its justification. 
233 The same can be said for constitutional law; this seems to be a general tendency in western law, see Mark V. 
Tushnet, The Rights Revolution in the Twentieth Century, 377, in: THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA, 
Vol. 3, 337 et seq. (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins, eds., 2008), (arguing that the concept of rights is 
shifting towards a broader understanding of the protection of “autonomy”).  
234 See the references supra, note 189. 
235 Poole, supra, note 211, 155; see also Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 437 (2003), who identifies different paradigms in American administrative 
law.  
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ignores the complexity of the administrative tasks that cannot be accessed by a focus on the 
individual rights which are at stake in a decision-making process. 
 
In global administrative law which is, in many respects, much more dependent on legitimation 
by state law in the stricter sense that the protagonists of a new look at a transnational legal 
sphere beyond the state tend to refer to general principles of law236 as – if not a source of 
legitimation – a limiting constraint, on the one hand, which serves as a legitimation basis, on 
the other hand. The role of these general principles remains rather unclear237 in modern legal 
theory, whereas, in more traditional approaches, the possibility of the deduction of such 
principles from the “nature of things”238 is focused in a way which is no longer plausible today. 
This construction is another version of the ignorance of the necessary responsive cumulative 
mode of law-making inherent in administrative processes of decision-making.239
 
 
The recent evolution of new complex types of procedure and decision-making has had a strong 
impact on the coordination of administrative and judicial decision-making (and on the 
legislator, as well). Reference to the more structured and reflexive types of knowledge needs 
more procedural rules which re-construct the informational infrastructure of complex decision-
making processes,240
 
 instead of the more substantive, rule-based type of decision of the society 
of the individuals of the past. It should be born in mind that “rule-based”, in the sense intended 
here includes all the layers or the normative and cognitive rules and conventions which are 
processed by reference to the individual right in the “private law society” and the single 
“administrative acts” of public administration which follow a similar logic, despite the seemingly 
sharp difference between public and private law. A similar evolution can be observed in private 
law, as well. This is, above all, true for tort law and liability for negligence, in particular. 
                                                 
236 Tarcisio Gazzini, General Principles of Law in the Field of Foreign Investment, 10 JOURNAL OF WORLD 
INVESTMENT AND TRADE 1 (2009); Axel Metzger, EXTRA LEGEM, INTRA IUS: ALLGEMEINE RECHTSGRUNDSÄTZE IM 
EUROPÄISCHEN PRIVATRECHT 483, 519 (2009). 
237 A perspective which is more focused on the creative and generative elements of an autonomous legal system 
and its emergent character would lead to a procedural approach which regards general principles of law as a 
secondary layer of reflection of the inherent “unrest” of a system which is implied in a continuous process of self-
transformation, see in this respect Metzger, ibid., 545 et seq.  
238 Giorgio del Vecchio, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW, 10 (1956); for a critique see Luhmann, supra, note 198, , 
418. 
239 Mashaw, supra, note 7, 1476, 
240 Thomas Vesting, Die Bedeutung von Information und Kommunikation für die verwaltungsrechtliche 
Systembildung, in: GRUNDLAGEN DES VERWALTUNGSRECHTS, vol. 2, supra, note 108, § 20 No. 1. 
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With reference to court practice, the co-ordination between administration and judicial control 
becomes much more complex,241 as well. Whereas judicial control of administrative acts in the 
“society of individuals” could be focused on the doctrinal construction, variation and 
preservation of rules and mediating doctrinal inter-relationships between cases and decisions, 
judicial control of the administrative decision-making in the “society of networks” is much more 
complicated: one could re-conceive it more as a “web” or a network of judgments which 
revolve around a cluster of cases,242 and process information and orientation to administration 
in a more diffuse way.243 This evolution can lead to a more politicised control,244 both in a 
positive sense as an attempt by courts to set the substantive standards under conditions of 
uncertainty, or in the negative sense of leaving more room to administrative discretion, or it 
has to be re-considered and re-framed in a new way. As in the past,245 however, the steering 
function of the law and of the statutes, in particular, should not be over-estimated:246 the 
deliberation of this question should not be focused in a one-sided way on the legislator – 
assuming a delegation of discretion enshrined in a statute where no such thing is to be found. 
Instead, a parallel should be drawn to the relationship between the law and its cognitive 
infrastructure in the “society of individuals”: administration can no longer be oriented by the 
distributed sets of experience; instead, it draws on a multiplicity of self-organised societal 
knowledge types including self-generated “best practices”,247 which stand for the innovative 
dimension of experimental future-oriented administrative action under conditions of 
uncertainty.248
                                                 
241 Carol Harlow & Richard Rawlings, LAW AND ADMINISTRATION. LAW IN CONTEXT, 3rd ed., 711 (2009); Armin von 
Bogdandy, GUBERNATIVE RECHTSETZUNG 368 (1999). 
 
242 Michael. J. Bommarito,II, Daniel M. Katz & Jon Zelner, Law as Seamless Web, in: PROCEEDINGS OF 12TH 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1419525 
243 Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Depoliticizing Administrative Law, University of Chicago Public Law Working 
Paper 223 (June 2008), ; for a critique Peter L. Strauss, Overseers or Deciders: The Courts in Administrative Law, 75 
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW 815 (2008). 
244 Miles & Sunstein, ibid.. 
245 For the changing conception of the relationship between (active) administrative regulation and the judicial 
control in history see Foster H. Sherwood, Judicial Control of Administrative Discretion 1932 – 1952, 6 THE 
WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY 730 (1953).  
246 The ambiguity of the role of courts in complex cases of controlling administrative behaviour is a big issue in 
recent literature, see Strauss, supra, note 243, 815; Kenneth A. Bamberger & id, Chevron’s Two Steps, 95 VIRGINIA 
LAW REVIEW 611, 621 (2009): should courts act as guides for future administrative decision making procedures or 
rather respect the creative function of administration? See for the creative role of administrative agencies Dorit 
Rubinstein Reiss, Administrative Agencies as Creators of Administrative Law Norms: Evidence from the UK, France 
and Sweden, in: COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 2010 (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter Lindseth, eds., to 
appear).  
247 See generally David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 294 (2006);  
248 The OECD plays also an important role in the search for transnational benchmarks Markku Lehtonen, OECD 
Benchmarking in Enhancing Policy Convergence. Harmonisation, Imposition and Diffusion Through the 
Environmental Performance Reviews, Ms. (2005). 
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The focus of control should as a consequence shift to a more network like mode, i.e., the rules 
for administrative decision-making in complex domains, planning law, environmental249 or high-
technology law, or other types of strategic goal-oriented ways which comprise chains and 
networks of operations. The frame of reference for judicial control cannot be stable 
conceptions of the norm, individual rights, experience or doctrinal concepts, but, instead, the 
administrative decision-making process has to be formulated in a more comprehensive open 
way with a view to the limitations set by the challenge of action under conditions of 
uncertainty. As a consequence, the “control-project”250 should also be formulated in a more 
open way, which is focused more on the outside observation (with a view to administration) of 
the plurality of network like inter-relationships between the different steps of the decision-
making process on the one hand, and the potential concatenation of several decisions on the 
same time-scale and with a view to potential future administrative operations. This means that, 
instead of the orientation on the “substantive rationality”251 of rules whose structures and 
goals can, more or less clearly, be pre-supposed, the “procedural rationality” of both the 
distributed network of administrative252 and the judicial decisions should be considered with 
regard to the learning of new practices.253 With Dorf & Sabel, one could talk about distributed 
practices of “experimentalism”,254
                                                 
249 Ladeur, supra, note 82.. 
 which as I would like to add, replace or supplement 
250 See White, supra, note 160, 220. 
251 Herbert A. Simon, From Substantive to Procedural Rationality,129, in: METHOD AN APPRAISAL IN ECONOMICS, 
(Spiro J. Latsis, ed., 1976). 
252 Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, supra, note 1, 20; see also Benedict Kingsbury, Omnilateralism and Partial 
International Communities: Contributions of the Emerging Global Administrative Law, 104 JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONALLAW AND DIPLOMACY 98 (2005); Eleanor D. Kinney, The Emerging Field of International 
Administrative Law: It’s Content and Potential, 54 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW 415 (2002); Armin von 
Bogdandy, General Principles of International Public Authority: Sketching a Research Field, in: 9 GERMAN LAW 
JOURNAL 1909 (2008).  http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf/Vol09No11/PDF_Vol_09_No_11_1909-
1938_Articles_von%20Bogdandy.pdf; for the terminology see Susan Marks, Naming Global Administrative Law, 37 
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 995 (2006).  
253 John S. Brown/Paul Duguid, Organizational Learning and Communities of Practice: Towards a Unified View of 
Working, Learning and Innovation, 2 ORGANIZATION SCIENCE 40 (1991); Frédéric Creplet, Olivier Dupouet, Francis 
Kern, Babak Mehmanpazir & Francis Munier, Consultants and Experts in Management Consulting Firms, 30 
RESEARCH POLICY 1517 (2001), id., Technology Policy in the Kowledge-Based Economy, 75, 100, in: INNOVATION 
POLICY IN A KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY (Patrick Llerena & Mireille Matt, eds., 2005); Patrick Cohendet, 
Knowing Communities in Organizations, in: ADVANCING KNOWLEDGE AND THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 91, 93 
(Brian Kahin & Dominique Foray, eds., 2006). 
254 See Michael C. Dorf and Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUMBIA LAW 
REVIEW 267, 314 (1998). See generally Charles F. Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, Learning from Difference: The New 
Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the European Union, European Governance, Paper No C-07-02 (May 
10, 2007), available online at <http://www.connex-network.org/eurogov/pdf/ egp-connex-C-07-02.pdf > ; Abbott 
& Snidal, supra, note, 2009, 43.; for the democratic potential of open cooperation see Errol Meidinger, Competitive 
Supra-governmental Regulation: How Could it be Democratic?, 8 CHICAGO JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 513 
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distributed experience as a core element of the infrastructure of the law. The relationship 
between administration and judicial control could be phrased as “ tangled web”,255 instead of 
as a stable rule-orientation, as might seem adequate for the “society of the individuals”. As 
Joanne Scott and Susan P. Sturm256 have luckily formulated, one might regard the role of the 
judiciary in this tangled web of decisions somewhat as a “catalyst” which functions as 
“enabling”, blocking or setting conditions of new actions under conditions of uncertainty, and 
uses the interference in the administrative process rather as a monitoring function thereby 
strengthening the internal rationality and transparency257 of the informational process and the 
learning capabilities in the future.258 At the same time, the judicial system should consider 
whether its own learning capabilities can be improved and stabilised by considering the 
productive concatenation of a new judgment with the requirements formulated in former 
decisions, and with a potential new judgment the future. In the analysis of judicial decision-
making, reference has already been made to the distributed rationality of a network of 
judgments which have to be read in a horizontal heterarchical mode of processing from case to 
case.259 This approach should not be read as a support for individualised situative decision-
making, not at all. There has to be a flexible concatenation which allows for the creation of 
reflexive web of “similar” judgments that tries to learn from the practical response of actors to 
its previous “entries” in the network of judgments. This institutional arrangement is a kind of 
“judicial polycentricity”260
                                                                                                                                                             
(2008); ; on the responsibility of transnational governance networks see James Bohman, DEMOCRACY ACROSS 
BORDERS. FROM DÊMOS TO DÊMOI, 2010, 44 seq.; Anne-Marie Slaughter, Global Government Networks, Global 
Information Agencies, and Disaggregated Democracy, 121, in: PUBLIC GOVERNANCE IN THE AGE OF 
GLOBALIZATION (Karl-Heinz Ladeur, ed., 2004); Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Globalization and the Conversion of Democracy 
to Polycentric Networks: Can Democracy Survive the End of the Nation State?, ibid., 87. 
 that corresponds to the polycentric processing of markets and its 
255 Harlow & Rawlings, supra, note 241, 711; Bommarito et. al., supra, note 242, epitomize the role of the 
“interconnectedness” of court decisions.  
256 Courts as Catalysts: Rethinking the Judicial Role in New Governance, 13 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN 
LAW 565 (2007). 
257 Esty, supra, note 125. 
258 See on the meaning of learning of general administrative law in jurisprudence, Carol Harlow, Changing the 
Mindset: The Place of Theory in English Administrative Law, 14 OXFORD JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 419 (1994); 
on learning through the development of „ordering ideas”, in the exchange between general and particular 
administrative law, Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann & Stéphanie Dagron, Deutsches und französisches Verwaltungsrecht 
im Vergleich ihrer Ordnungsideen, 45 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES UND VÖLKERRECHT 395 
(2007). 
259 See in a theoretical perspective on the concept of network as a paradigm of conceptual construction Seth J. 
Chandler, The Network structure of Supreme Court Jurisprudence, University of Houston Law Center No. 2005-W-
01.. 
260 See Paul Dragos Aligica & Peter J. Boettke, CHALLENGING INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND DEVELOPMENT. THE 
BLOOMINGTON SCHOOL, 26 et seq., 63 (2009); see also Robert Cover, 30, in: PROCEDURE (id., Owen Fiss, & Judith 
Resnick, eds., 1988). 
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administrative observation and limitation261
 
 (in the past with the help of the “actes 
administratifs” in particular). 
The network based approach262 developed here would assume that there is also a process of 
coupling between the practical networks of administrative decision-making and the private 
processes of contracting or arguing about the limits of rights (damage, negligence, etc.263) on 
the one hand, and the networks of court judgments which have to cope with the internal 
requirements of preserving consistency and the external requirement of keeping the practical 
networks of administration and private actors (in private law) productive and dynamic – this 
includes the respect for private autonomy in private law and discretion in public law, on the 
other. Robert Cover has regarded “jurisdictional redundancy” as a flexible strategy of avoiding 
errors.264 This idea is not to be confined to the plurality of courts in federal systems alone, but it 
should include the polycentric web of judgments that try to generate and manage the “density 
of experience”.265 Methodological “dissensus”266
 
 can also be regarded as a productive element 
in a more experimental search for new rules and patterns of co-ordination in both private an 
public law as long as a web-like structure of mutual reference, reflection, and revision is 
preserved with a view to the proactive generation of a common frame of judgment that loosely 
integrates a practice which is taken seriously. 
C. A COMPARATIVE LOOK AT THE NETWORK LIKE STRUCTURE OF TRANSNATIONAL COURT PRACTICE 
IN THE FIELD OF (PRIVATE) MEDIA LAW IN PARTICULAR 
 
A closer look at Lex Mercatoria or the other private legal regimes shows that they have formed 
a new legal order for a network of (regular) participants, transnational economic and legal 
transactions in particular,267
                                                 
261 At the same time there seems to be a structural limit to the intervention of courts into polycentric public-
private networks, Noonan, Sabel & Simon, supra, note 205, 559. 
 which does not cover the whole of the arena of transnational 
262 For an Overview of the new relationship between systems theory and the new concepts of “network” see 
Tacke, supra, note 177, 243. 
263 Kenneth S. Abraham, Custom, Noncustomary Practice, and Negligence, 109 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 1784 at 
1796 (2009). 
264 Cover, supra, note 260, 30. 
265 Cover, ibid., 30. 
266 See Ethan J. Leib & Michael Serota, Feature Essay: The Costs of Consensus in Statutory Construction, YALE LAW 
JOURNAL online, www.yalelawjournal.org, July 30th 2010; this article is a critique of Abbe R. Gluck, The States as 
Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE 
LAW JOURNAL 1750 (2010). 
267 Teubner, supra, note 17. 
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exchange.268 The bearers of this network of law are (in private law) big firms, which 
continuously engage in an exchange of roles (they act both as sellers/providers and as buyers). 
This engagement is the basis for the emergence of common interests which are shared by 
transnational corporate actors in particular. At the other end of the range of action formats in 
transnational affairs, we must not forget the smaller- and medium-sized firms (SMEs) which 
only rarely engage in transnational transactions or the role of consumers. In this field, 
transnational contracts are still judged in cases of conflict by state courts. And it seems to be far 
from simple to develop a homogeneous stable court practice even upon the basis of a uniform 
legal text such as the Convention on International Sale of Goods (CISG)269 and in spite of a duty 
imposed on courts to consider the common interest in a homogeneous legal practice.270 The 
networking271 in this latter case is done by courts and not by the participants in transactional 
legal affairs, as in the field of Lex Mercatoria. This seems to be a common denominator which 
might be productive in conceptualising global law – public and private: The emergence of a 
global type of law “beyond the state” pre-supposes a network based common interest of 
participants,272 which is not identical with the public interest of an overarching community. This 
does not, from the outset, speak against the recognition of a new type of global law – far from 
it. It should, perhaps, warn us not to regard this phenomenon as just a transitory momentum 
which, in the long run, ends up in the “constitutionalised” world society.273
                                                 
268 For the rise of self-regulation of private actors see Virginia Haufler, Globalization and Industry Self-regulation, 
226, in: GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (Miles Kahler & David A. Lake, eds., 2003); Peter Gourevitch, 
Corporate Governance: Global Markets, National Politics, ibid., 305. 
 It would be 
269 Schwenzer & Hachem, supra, note 184, 468: who point out that the duty to refer to foreign judgments is no 
equivalent to the integrative function of a common supreme court. 
270 Kilian, supra, note 184; Schwenzer & Hachem, ibid.  
271 The “network” concept is often used in a loose way; it should specified with respect to „some combination of 
informality, equality, and commitment” Paul DiMaggio, Conclusion: The Futures of Business Organization and 
Paradoxes of Change, in: id. (ed.), supra, note 158, 212 — I would add its functionality for a mode of generation of 
knowledge and management of uncertainty; see for the concept of the “disaggregated State” Anne Marie 
Slaughter, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004); see also the contributions in: Ino Augsberg, Tobias Gostomzyk & Lars 
Viellechner, DENKEN IN NETZWERKEN (2009). 
272 See The examples in Michael S. Barr and Geoffrey P. Miller, Global Administrative Law: The View from Basel, 17 
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 15 (2006) 15; Michael Livermore, Authority and Legitimacy in 
Global Governance: Deliberation, Institutional Differentiation, and the Codex Alimentarius, 81 NEW YORK 
UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 776 (2006); Gus Van Harten and Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a 
Species of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 121 (2006). 
273 Deborah Cass, The Constitutionalization of the World Trade Organization: Legitimacy, Democracy, and 
Communityin the International Trading System (2005); Neil Walker, Constitutionalism in a New Key: The EU and the 
WTO, 31, in: The EU and the WTO: Legal and Constitutional Issues (Gráinne de Burca & Joanne Scott, eds., 2001); 
Anne Peters, Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of Fundamental International Norms 
and Structures, 19 LEIDEN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 579 (2006); David Dyzenhaus, The Rule of 
(Administrative) Law in International Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS, 127, 139 (2005); Euan 
MacDonald, The ‚Emergence’ of Global Administrative Law, 2007, www.iijl.org/GAL/documents/MacDonald.pdf; 
with reference to human rights in particular Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Time for a United Nations ‘Global Compact’ 
for Integrating Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organizations: Lessons from European Integration, 13 
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 621, 631 (2002); Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Charter As 
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preferable to distinguish more reflexive mechanisms in the practice of self-organised rules, 
which would – following the conception of the inter-relationship between law and different 
forms of social convention –include also rules of a practice which implicitly also formulate 
considerations about the balancing of competing interests of parties which are not involved in 
the network itself. 
 
This is the case, for example, in the media, which continuously experiment with new formats of 
a construction of reality as they have to observe not only “reality”, but also the self-
transformation of the “identity” of the recipients themselves.274 According to a more collective 
societal (and not only individualistic) understanding of civil rights, the freedom of the press, in 
particular, also comprises the autonomy of the press as a societal institution with the 
consequence that it implies the freedom to formulate and modulate conceptions of the public 
interest and modes of its “formatting”.275 At the same time, this implies a distributed tentative 
mode of considering competing interests such as the privacy of media stars and politicians.276 
The role of courts should protect these rights, of course, but, at the same time, this implies a 
respect for the whole network of media communication and the logic of its functioning: the 
protection of conflicting rights should be fine-tuned to the rules and conventions of the media 
and not ignore its autonomy also with regard to the re-formulation of its understanding of, for 
example, what the public realm is (European Court of Human Rights, ECHR).277
                                                                                                                                                             
Constitution of the International Community, 36 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 529 (1998); id., 
‚We the Peoples of the United Nations’: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form in International Law, 269, in: 
THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM. CONSTITUENT POWER AND CONSTITUTIONAL FORM (Martin Loughlin & 
Neil Walker, eds, 2007) and, for a broader approach not limited to the UN framework, see two articles by Erika de 
Wet, The International Constitutional Order, 55 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 51 (2006); 
epitomizing rather the difference between administrative and constitutionalist approaches to gobal law: Nico 
Krisch, The Pluralism of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 247, 253 
(2006); Esty, supra, note 125, 1490; for a differentiated view cf. also Sabino Cassese, Administrative Law Without 
the State? The Challenge of Global Regulation, 37 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
POLITICS 663 (2005) . 
 This means that 
the constraints set by competing rights have to be formulated by courts, instead from a 
heterarchical point of observation which would be focused on “re-entering” a constraint into 
274 See also Daniel J. Solove, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY (2008): the contradictory relationship between privacy and 
publicity is also a consequence of the shaky ground on which the evolution of the media takes place. 
275 Karl-Heinz Ladeur, DAS MEDIENRECHT UND DIE ÖKONOMIE DER AUFMERKSAMKEIT (2007). 
276 See for the relationship between protection of substantive rights of individuals (“dignity”) and a more formal 
process of public controversy James Q. Whitman, ‘Human Dignity’ in Europe and the United States, the Social 
Foundations, 108, in: Nolte (ed.), supra, note 210, 108. 
277 See with reference to the European judgments on the status of religion in public (schools) Ino Augsberg & Kai 
Engelbrecht, Staatlicher Gebrauch religiöser Symbole im Licht der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, 65 
JURISTENZEITUNG 450 (2010), who demonstrate the difficulties European courts have in managing the cultural 
pluralism in Europe. 
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the network for a re-modelling which bears in mind the procedural rationality which epitomises 
the rules and requirements of processing information under conditions of uncertainty278 and 
not to be blinded by traditional substantive rule orientation.279 This means that courts, instead, 
fulfil the role of oversight which should try to irritate the self-organisational potential of the 
media network in order to broaden the productive range of possibilities of reaction of the 
media system and not focus on a case-to-case-based substantial rationality of stable rules.280 
The same is true for other private net-based communication such as the ebay281 valuation 
system, or ICANN,282 a system with its own private formal organisation which also has to find a 
balance between conflicting rights and interests. These examples could be counted as versions 
of self-organisation which need a certain public oversight because of the involvement of 
outsiders who cannot participate in the process of generating self-organised rules.283 This is not 
so unusual if one considers even the traditional experience-based rules, which courts refer to 
when deciding on “negligence”284
                                                 
278 This is true in particular for transnational law See Cinto Della Cananea, Beyond the Stae: the Europeanization 
and Globalization of Procedural Administrative Law, 9 EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW 563 (2003). 
 or the preservation of the public order. The only major 
difference is to be seen in the fact that experience is more or less a spontaneously generated 
set of practical rules which has developed only a thin institutional layer in some fields 
(associations of engineers, etc.), whereas, in the case of a differentiated self-reflexive potential 
279 This problematique includes also the evaluation of scientific uncertainty, see Stephanie Tai, Uncertainty About 
Uncertainty: The Impact of Judicial Decisions on Assessing Scientific Uncertainty, University of Wisconsin, SSRN; 
Karl-Heinz Ladeur, The Role of Contracts and Networks in Public Governance: The Importance of the ‘Social 
Epistemology’ of Decision Making, 14 INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 329 (2007). 
280 James Q. Whitman, supra, note 276. 
281 Karl-Heinz Ladeur, EBAY-Bewertungssystem und staatlicher Rechtsschutz von Persönlichkeitsrechten, 10 
KOMMUNIKATION & RECHT 85 (2007). 
282 Milton L. Mueller, John Mathiason & Hans Klein, The Internet and Global Governance:Principles and Norms for a 
New Regime, 13 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 237 (2007) ; see for the tension between domestic legal principles and the 
self organized global ICANN regulatory regime Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route 
around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE LAW JOURNAL 17, 57 et seq. (2000); Jonathan Zittrain, Between the 
Public and Private. Comments before Congress, 14 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL 1077 (1999); Jochen von 
Bernstorff, The Structural Limitations of Network Governance: ICANN as a Case in Point, 257, in: Christian Joerges, 
Inger-Johanne Sand & Gunter Teubner (eds.), supra, note 105; Karl-Heinz Ladeur & Lars Viellechner, Die 
transnationale Expansion staatlicher Grundrechte: Zur Konstitutionalisierung globaler Privaterchtsregimes, 46 
ARCHIV DES VÖLKERRECHTS 42 (2008).  
283 Lawrence R. Helfer, Whither the UDRP: Autonomous, Americanized, or Cosmopolitan?, 12 CARDOZO JOURNAL 
OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 493 (2004); id. & Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Designing Non-National 
Systems: the Case of Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 43 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW 141 
(2001); Michael Froomkin, ICANN’s «Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy» - Causes and (Partial) Cures, 67 
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW 605 (2002). 
284 Lefebvre, supra, note 79, 19; Gert Brüggemeier, HAFTUNGSRECHT. STRUKTUR, PRINZIPIEN, SCHUTZBEREICH 56 
(2006); for the dependence of the concept of “negligence” on changing social norms See also Simon Deakin, Angus 
Johnston & Basil Markesinis, MARKESINIS AND DEAKIN’S TORT LAW, 8th ed., 113 (2008); Steven A. Hetcher, 
Creating Safe Social Norms in a Dangerous World, Vanderbilt Law School, Joe C. Davis Working Paper No. 99-
5.(arguing that game theory misses the collective element of social norms in the process of concretizing 
negligence). 
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of observation and revision of rules of practice to be followed by big firms (even below the level 
of formalisation in explicit standards285), the court has to consider the strategic effects of its 
decision-making practice in the search processes of the incumbent firms (duties to warn). These 
remarks should have demonstrated that private self-organisation and public oversight are not 
mutually exclusive. Law-making has always been process-driven, the institutionalised stable 
component used to be nested with the societal knowledge basis and with strategic action taken 
by legal practitioners.286
 
 
D. AFTER THE EXPERIMENTAL CREATION OF NEW COOPERATIVE FORMS OF 
ADMINISTRATION…WHAT? THE CODIFICATION? 
 
The recent evolution of more complex administrative processes has raised interest in the 
internal procedures of generating information, knowledge, and evaluation of alternatives, 
etc.,287 within the administration, which are no longer obvious, as was the case in the past. 
Administrative procedures of information as a side-effect of the increasing complexity of 
decision-making informal procedures288 of knowledge generation and forms of public- private 
co-operation289 (including contracting290) have been developed – again from within the 
administration.291
                                                 
285 See the contributions in: MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE OF GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE (Gerd Winter, ed., 
2006); Martin Herberg, GLOBALISIERUNG UND PRIVATE SELBSTREGULIERUNG: UMWELTSCHUTZ IN 
MULTINATIONALEN UNTERNEHMEN (2007); also the contributions in: RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS. SELF-GOVERNANCE 
AND LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC TRANSACTIONS (Olaf Dilling, Martin Herberg & Gerd Winter, eds., 
2008), in particular Errol Meidinger, Multi-Interest Self Governance through Global Product Certification Chains, 
ibid., 259. 
 Approaches to establish a legal structure for this version of “co-operative 
286 Quack, supra, note 185, 643, 644. 
287 Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 1749 (2007) 
(emphasizing the role of courts to create acceptable rules for administrative agencies); for a critique that 
emphasizes the role of courts in the protection of rights as opposed to public policies see McNollgast & Daniel B. 
Rodriguez, Administrative Law Agonists, 108 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW, SIDEBAR 2008; see generally Stuart Shapiro 
& David Guston, Procedural Control of the Bureaucracy, Peer Review, and Epistemic Drift, 17 JOURNAL OF PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION, RESEARCH & THEORY 535 (2007); (underlining the dependency of conceptions of administrative 
control on the transformation of “embodied” knowledge). 
288 See for the difficulties to fit informal action into traditional legal administrative formats Kersten & Lenski, supra, 
note 9, 521. 
289 See Errol Meidinger, The Administrative Law of Global Private-Public Regulation: the Case of Forestry, 17 
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 47 (2006). 
290 See only Andreas Abegg, Die Vertragsfreiheit der Verwaltung – Verwaltungsverträge im Schatten des Rechts, 
128 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR SCHWEIZERISCHES RECHT 387 (2009). 
291 This development concept is related to the rise of the “governance”, Lobel, supra, note 159. 
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administration”292 have failed hitherto. This is symptomatic for the relationship between the 
legislator and the administration: the major instruments of administrative action as such are 
beyond the reach of general regulation. This is due to the fact that the relationships between 
“public” and “private”293
 
 always contain an element of a “self-fulfilling prophecy”: what is 
accepted as “regarding all” is an emergent property of entangled processes of the observation 
of practices and of paradigmatic settlements that are dependent on experiment. They can only 
be controlled on a case-to-case basis by the judges. The legislative form of rule-making is only 
compatible with administrative action if the networks of decision-making have developed 
contours – especially upon the basis of conflicting legal interests, subjective rights in particular. 
Notwithstanding this, this constellation is accessible only to a limited re-structuring by the 
legislator, which leaves enough potential for the shaping of different cases and the 
experimentation with different patterns of the management of inter-relationships. 
The reflection on the evolution of modern law and its transformation during the 20th century 
have demonstrated the importance of the cognitive infrastructure of legal practice which has 
changed considerably, not only with regard to the character of the knowledge base itself upon 
which legal decision-making depends continuously. The law is not just super-imposed upon a 
cognitive base which allows it to be specified case-by-case, but the inter-relationship of both 
the cognitive and the normative layer of the law is not a passive one. The exchange is pre-
structured by secondary normalising meta-rules which stabilise the regularity of the process of 
reproduction of the “pool of variety” for different types of practices, and, at the same time, the 
law itself develops its own set of internal rules of interpretation, of estimating probabilities, 
proof rules in cases of non liquet, rules of presumption, of co-ordinating societal conventions 
and the legal rules in particular.294
                                                 
292 Gunnar Folke Schuppert, Verwaltungskooperationsrecht (Public Private Partnership): Regelungs- und 
Handlungsoptionen eines Rechtsrahmens für Public Private Partnership – Expertise for the Federal Minister of 
Internal Affairs, 2001, Attachment E (containing a proposal of an amendment to the Administrative Procedure Act); 
for the US See the proposal of a “Draft Collaborative Governance Executive Order”, appendix to Lisa Blomgren 
Bingham, The Next Generation of Administrative Law: Building the Legal Infrastructure for Collaborative 
Governance, WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 297 (2010) (the focus is on administrative values); the attempt to legalize 
and formalize cooperation is probably a misleading idea; see Freeman, supra, note 4 (1998), because it is a version 
of what one may call with Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, supra, note 254, 318: “democratic experimentalism” 
that does not allow for ex ante delegation of competencies and legislative formulation of goals; see in the same 
vein for American attempts to raise the level of transparency in new types of flexible administrative procedures, 
William Funk, Public Participation and Transparency in Administrative Law: Three Examples as an Object, 61 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW 171 (2009). 
 In addition to this, there is an intermediate layer in which 
the role of the producers of the knowledge base is institutionalised (from public distributed 
knowledge accumulation) via organised reproduction in big firms towards postmodern 
network-like “epistemic communities” which provoke a fragmentation of the knowledge 
production. This transformation finds its repercussion in the shifting focus of the generation of 
293 See Lobel, supra, note 159; Freeman, supra, note 4. 
294 See for the “internal law of administration” which is a necessary infrastructure of administrative operations and 
that is largely neglected or wryly looked at as being a type of non-law or illegitimate altogether Mashaw, supra, 
note 6, 1636; id., supra, note 7,1413, 1461. 
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“order”: from substantive rationality which supports the reproduction of rules to the 
management of conflicting group- and organisation-based knowledge by principles of balancing 
and the respect of proportionality – which are both open to the valuation of factual interests 
and positions – and finally the emergence of proceduralisation,295 which consists of an 
increasing importance of the proactive stimulation of the process of generation of knowledge in 
private and public networks. This change ends in a process of fragmentation of different arenas 
and allows only a loose mode of coupling between the differentiated networks by broad rules 
which are oriented at the open co-ordination of the tangled web of the law within a complex 
“network of networks”. One should epitomise that the emergence of the “networks of law” in 
the postmodern society develops more and more different arenas for the construction of order 
in which the combination of cognitive and normative rules varies to a considerable extent. The 
close co-ordination in fragmented networks excludes outsiders, while, at the same time, the 
complexity and future orientation of the postmodern law reduces the protection granted in 
former times by “rights”296 because their frame of reference was, in the past (liberal society), 
also pre-structured by the general limitations imposed on subjective rights by other holders of 
rights: if the differentiation of the networks of operators increases, this will also change the 
general and universal frame of reference for the definition of the rules of co-ordination of rights 
of different subjects. At the same time, this evolution is - for the same reason - a challenge for 
the state, which loses its general frame of reference itself. The rules of co-ordination within the 
emerging “network of networks” of the law, which is much more loosely coupled than in the 
past, have not found their contours yet. This is why theoretical positions that question the legal 
character of the new self-organised norms which emerge in the differentiated range of rules 
that is characteristic of the postmodern normative “network of networks” miss the point: the 
increasing complexity of the cognitive embeddedness of legal norms demands a higher level of 
reflexivity of their mutual inter-dependence; a new constructive and selective dimension with 
regard to the fragmented cognitive rules and the construction of a whole domain of options 
(instead of the experimentation on a stable trajectory laid out by experience or the corporatist 
consensus based rules) has to be modelled. This is why the “internal” cognitive preparation of 
the administrative decision-making processes, which was more or less negligible in the 
outcome-oriented administrative law of the “society of individuals” has to be attributed 
normative character in different forms. This goes for administrative rule-making in the US, 
which uses “notice and comment”-procedures297
                                                 
295 Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Proceduralisation and its Use in a Post-Modern Legal Policy, 53, in: GOVERNANCE IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION (Olivier De Schutter et al., eds., 2001). 
 for the set up of enforcement rules which can 
no longer be derived from the law or be pre-supposed as the product of internal 
(administrative) or external (social) experience – for example, with regard to the societal 
296 See for Germany Wolfgang Kahl, Über einige Pfade und Tendenzen in Verwaltungsrecht und 
Verwaltungswissenschaft – ein Zwischenbericht, 42 DIE VERWALTUNG 471, 473 (2009). 
297 Sean Farhang, THE LITIGATION STATE:PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAW SUITS, 21 (2010). 
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approach to “danger”.298 This is also the reason why more and more interests are transformed 
into rights to be heard, and to be protected from private or public interference below the level 
of the classical conception of “infringement” and “harm”.299
 
  
This is a problematical side-effect of the fragmentation of the “networks of the law”,300 which 
leads to a phenomenon which Sean Farhang301 has called the “litigation state”: the courts are 
involved in a much more intense mode in the process of enforcement of legal norms.302 This is 
why the procedure and the reflection of the “internal” side of administration necessarily get a 
new normative dimension. The focus on the “publicness” of rules, or the search for a secondary 
layer of control of primary rules in the sense of H.L.A. Hart,303 misses this point, and it also 
transcends the horizon of H.L.A. Hart’s conception of law. This increasing importance of the 
“internal side” of the processing of decision-making can also be observed in private law. 
Michael Power, in particular, has drawn our attention to this phenomenon: the rise of “risk” as 
a challenge has found its repercussion in the “precautionary principle”,304
 
 which is not limited 
to the environmental law, but finds a parallel, for example, in financial market regulation where 
“negligence” and the liability have shown to be insufficient for the management of complex 
risks. This reflexivity of both private and public law beyond the classical limits of “rights”, on the 
one hand, and stable behaviour-oriented norms, on the other, leads to a transformation of 
normativity in postmodernity. The traditional criteria for the definition of law, as opposed to 
factual rules, are no longer adequate for the observation of the dynamic of a fragmented self-
reflexive legal system that necessarily expands the field of relevance and includes the 
procedural rules of construction of administrative decisions. 
                                                 
298 Ladeur, supra, note 82. 
299 Urbinati, supra, note 134. 
300 See Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Die Netzwerke des Rechts, 143, in: NETZWERKE IN DER FUNKTIONAL DIFFERENZIERTEN 
GESELLSCHAFT (Michael Bommes & Veronika Tacke, eds., 2010). 
301 Farhang, supra, note 297.  
302 In my view Sean Farhang, supra, note 297, 45 et seq., overestimates the impact of the specific institutional 
setting of the US (tension between Congress and the presidential control of administrative agencies in particular. 
The phenomenon can be observed in other countries with different institutions, as well. It is rather due to the 
fragmentation of the cognitive basis of society. 
303 Kingsbury, supra, note 9 (2009); Teubner, see the references supra, note 23; for a critique (of Kingsbury) See 
Alexander Somek, The Concept of Law in Global Administrative Law, 20 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 985, 986 (2009), who criticizes the theoretical limitations of the New York approach to global administrative 
law in as much as its focus is on rather broad concepts of “accountability” and not on “legal relationships” and 
“rights”; see also Armin von Bogdandy, Philipp Dann & Matthias Goldmann, Developing the Publicness of Public 
International Law: Towards a Legal Framework of Global Governance Activities, 9 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL 1375 
(2008) available at: www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf/Vol09No11/PDF_Vol_09_No_11_1375-
1400_Articles_von%20Bogdandy_Dann_Goldmann.pdf. – but this is a position which neglects the possibility that 
the concept of law itself might undergo a process of transformation; for an analysis of the problems with the 
identification of a “legal source” in postmodernity, see also Zumbansen, supra, note 202,142.  
304 Sadeleer, supra, note 138. 
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This development finds a correspondence in the increasing internal fragmentation of the 
private firm and the decline of the traditional hierarchical “control project”, i.e., the rise of 
heterarchical versions of intra-organisational distribution of competencies. It is reflected in the 
overarching establishment of public control of the internal processes of knowledge generation 
within companies.305
 
  
V. OUTLOOK 
 
The paper has tried to show that the evolution of administrative law is characterised by periods 
of creative construction of new forms, instruments and procedures of administrative law in the 
administrative decision-making procedures. Court control of these processes should not be 
interpreted as being the only legal source of administrative law (“judge made law”) before the 
partial codification of general administrative law could be brought about in Europe and the US. 
If one bears this evolution in mind, it comes as no surprise that the new hybrid postmodern 
forms of decision-making in both domestic and global public-private networks cannot easily be 
subsumed under established administrative rules because the experimentation with, and the 
search for, new forms and procedures of transnational decision-making has not yet come to a 
conclusion. This constellation is not new in the evolution of administrative law, and it cannot be 
reduced to the process of globalisation alone:306 it is one of the phenomena of the emergence 
of a new paradigm of (administrative) law: the law of the “network society”.307
 
 
This process demonstrates that also global administrative law cannot be conceived as a mere 
challenge to the sovereign nation state and the permeability of its territorial borders. Its 
evolution is a consequence of a deeper transformation of both the economic system and the 
nation state. As has been demonstrated, the central components of the classical liberal legal 
system were dependent on stable concepts of property and the territory and their paradigmatic 
role. The evolution of administration and the economic system is characterised by the rise of 
the information and of knowledge as the main resource and frame of reference for decision-
making. The dynamic of the postmodern “knowledge society” is at the bottom of the rapid self-
transcendence of the environment of the legal system. Not only the territorial borders of the 
state, but also the traditional conceptual and institutional separations on which administrative 
law was founded have been severed. 
 
                                                 
305 See Michael Power, THE AUDIT SOCIETY. RITUALS OF VERIFICATION (1999), who demonstrates also the 
disfunctionalities of this new approach. 
306 See for the dense relationship between domestic institutions and globalization Jude C. Hays, GLOBALIZATION 
AND THE NEW POLITICS OF EMBEDDED LIBERALISM 8, 11 (2009). 
307 See Ladeur, supra, note 300, 143. 
2011]                                 THE EVOLUTION OF GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW                                55 
As a consequence both for the domestic layer of administrative law and the emerging global 
administrative law, new forms, procedures and meta-rules for an administration beyond the 
nation state have to be designed.308 Considering the dynamic nature of the administration in, 
and of, networks, more evaluation309
 
 ex post and more indirect rule-making will be necessary: 
“steering” administrative practice ex ante by statutes or by the “application” of informal rules 
of experience will not be sufficient. The new knowledge base of the “society of networks” will 
allow for more self-organised rules and patterns, while, at the same time, the decreasing 
relevance of stable norms in both senses should lead to a focus on procedural norms which are 
designed with regard to the generation of new knowledge that will be useful for the evaluation 
ex post. 
We are still in the process of experimentation which will generate new forms of action, new 
procedures, new types of co-ordination between public and private actors. It may well be the 
case that the role of the judiciary in this new evolutionary process will be negligible, not to 
mention codification by the legislator. What should be conceivable is a new type of co-
operation between domestic agencies and the legislator, with the prospect of coupling 
transnational procedures of decision-making and domestic legitimation and accountability of 
decision-makers.310 New elements of an inter-twinement of domestic and transnational law 
might be developing.311
 
 
                                                 
308 For the necessity to spread administrative rules in countries of the “Third World” see 
www.transparency.org./global_priorities/aid_corruption; Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay & Massimo Mastruzzi, 
Measuring Corruption: Myths and Realities, The World Bank Institute. Development Outreach, Januar 2007, 
www1.worldbank.org/devoutreach; Susan Rose-Ackerman, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, 
CONSEQUENCES AND REFORM IX (1999); Migai Akech, Development Partners and Governance of Public 
Procurement in Kenya: Enhancing Democracy in the Administration of Aid, 37 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 829 (2006); with a focus on strengthening accountability through 
administrative law (834). 
309 For a theoretical perspective on “evaluation” as second order knowledge that reuses the same knowledge that 
has already been referred to in the decision making process Rudolf Stichweh, Wissensgesellschaft und 
Wissenssystem, 30 SCHWEIZERISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR SOZIOLOGIE, 147, 155 (2004). 
310 David Dyzenhaus, Accountability and the Concept of (Global) Administrative Law, IILJ Working Paper 2008/7, at 
http://www.iilj.org/publications/2008-7Dyzenhaus.asp, 13. 
311 For new forms of accountability that emerge at the global level See Helmut Willke, SMART GOVERNANCE: 
GOVERNING THE GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 50 (2007). 
